



Partisan fertility in the aftermath of the Great Recession

Chiara Comolli and Gunnar Andersson

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Abstract

The timing of fertility declines in developed societies during the last decade first prompted scholars to associate it with the Great Recession of 2008. However, the persistence of fertility declines during the 2010s suggests that other developments, maybe triggered by the crisis, have influenced fertility. Here, we investigate how the decline in generalized trust as reflected in growing support for right-wing populist parties may have affected childbearing trends. We focus on Sweden where the vote share of Sweden Democrats increased six-fold between 2006 and 2018 and fertility rates simultaneously declined by almost fifteen percent. We use population-register data to construct complete individual-level fertility histories and link women to the SD share of votes in their municipality of residence in the elections that were held in 2006, 2010, and 2014. We estimate fixed effects and difference-in-difference fertility models and demonstrate that changes in the support for Sweden Democrats in the local municipality influenced the average woman's probability of having a child in a negative direction, net of observed and unobserved individual-level and municipality characteristics. The negative impact was strongest for highly educated women.

Keywords: fertility, fertility trends, trust, Sweden Democrats, Sweden

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Introduction

Persistently low birth rates contribute to population ageing and life-course inequalities, posing challenges to social and financial sustainability in developed societies. In most high-income countries, Total Fertility Rates (TFR) have been declining persistently during the last decade with countries as diverse as England, Finland, Greece, Norway and the United States reporting all-time-low TFRs in 2019 (Eurostat, 2020). Similarly, fertility in Sweden has been in constant decline since 2010, with a TFR going from close to two children per woman in that year to 1.71 in 2019 (SCB). Recent research suggests that, at least in Europe, these declines are not merely temporary drops due to accelerating postponement of childbearing (*tempo effects*), but rather a sign of what may produce a more permanent decrease (*quantum effects*) in cohort fertility (Bongaarts and Feeney, 1998; Hellstrand et al., 2020).

The simultaneous onset of such widespread fertility declines can convincingly be linked to the triggering event of the Great Recession that hit the U.S. in the fall of 2007 and Europe a few months later (Adsera, 2011; Sobotka et al., 2011; Cherlin et al., 2013; Goldstein et al., 2013; Comolli and Bernardi, 2015; Schneider, 2015; Comolli, 2021). When incomes drop and unemployment rises long-term commitments such as investments in housing, the formation of marriages and decisions to have a child tend to be postponed to financially more lenient times. The initial declines in TFRs during the early 2010s were thus not surprising as births were postponed to a future with better economic prospects. However, despite the economic recovery later on in the 2010s, a situation with recuperated fertility failed to materialize and TFRs continued their descent. In Sweden as elsewhere, macroeconomic indicators seem not able to explain the continued and accelerated fertility declines during the 2010s (Comolli et al., 2021).

While individuals' economic prospects represent a strong driving force in childbearing decisions, objective economic conditions are not the unique rationale of childbearing. First, the subjective perception of those conditions may lead to other evaluations of current and future prospects in relation to childbearing opportunities (Vignoli et al., 2020a, b). Part of the persistent fertility decline in Europe has, in fact, been linked to enduring *economic uncertainty* that causes a re-evaluation of future prospects and the postponement of commitments like having children (Comolli and Vignoli, 2021). Second, the Great Recession in Europe and beyond was accompanied and followed by other social developments, beyond those of labor market deterioration and income drops, that might as well have influenced people's willingness to have children. Such developments include different aspects of growing social inequalities, lower social cohesion, mounting intergenerational tensions, and anti-immigrant opinions (Cronin, 2013). In other words, the unequal impact of and recovery from the Great Recession appear to have affected many other dimensions of social relationships between individuals.

Individuals do not live and take decisions in isolation but are embedded in their social context (Elder, 1974; Entwisle, 2007). Newly emerging inequalities may depress the sense of civic spirit, trust, and civic engagement, and correlate with social and political polarization, as reflected in the emergence of populist parties (Uslaner and Brown, 2005; Rydgren, 2007). Inequalities in access to different aspects of social capital may cause the marginalization of groups of individuals, with reduced social trust and anxiety over the preservation of their social status (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009; Kearney and Levine, 2014). In the context of social change, a high level of generalized trust may mitigate feelings of uncertainty (Colquitt et al., 2012). On the contrary, the shredding of good practices related to generalized trust induces a sense of insecurity that pervades people's lives, especially during times of rapid and un-anticipated social change (Lind, 2001; Arpino and Obydenkova, 2020).

In this study, we focus on the declining trust in social systems that is reflected in growing support for Radical Right Parties (RRP) and how this may be related to childbearing trends. Political sociologists have identified social inequalities, increasing economic and social polarization, and declining access to different dimensions of social capital as driving forces behind the increasing success of RRP in Europe (Rydgren, 2007; Shayo, 2009; Han, 2016; Uslaner, 2002; Jesuit et al., 2009; Giustozzi and Gangl, 2021). In our study design, we use the increasing municipality vote share for the RRP in Sweden as a measure of social dynamics at the local level and link it to the changes in childbearing that have been observed for the last decade. Our hypothesis is that political sentiments in the municipality of residence, net of the sociodemographic, cultural and economic conditions that also determine the success of right-wing parties, represents an indicator of (declining) generalized trust which negatively influences childbearing. We use Swedish register data to reconstruct complete childbearing histories of women born and residing in Sweden during the years under observation (2006-2017). We link women to the share of votes obtained by the Sweden Democrats (SD) in their municipality of residence during the three elections that were held in the period of interest: 2006, 2010 and 2014. We run fixed effects and difference-in-difference models of fertility outcomes to investigate how the change in support for SD in the local municipality may have influenced women's probability of having children, net of the individual and municipality observed and unobserved characteristics that influence both voting patterns in the municipality and individual women's propensity to have a child.

Theoretical Background

Economic uncertainty and fertility

One of the main driving forces of fertility behavior is represented by individuals' economic prospects. The New Home Economics theory sees childbearing as a rational choice based on the costs and benefits of children and posits that a decline in a household's income is linked to the postponement of childbearing (Becker, 1993). When incomes drop and unemployment rates rise, long-term commitments such as family formation and having children may benefit from being postponed to financially more secure periods. The onset of the widespread fertility declines in advanced economies during the 2010s has also been convincingly linked to the Great Recession that hit the United States in the fall of 2007 and Europe a few months later (Goldstein et al., 2013). The declines in Total Fertility Rates (TFR) during the first years of the 2010s were not surprising as births could be postponed to a future with better economic prospects. Despite the economic recovery in the late 2010s, however, European TFRs continued their descent (Eurostat, 2020). Sweden registered a 15% drop in fertility rates in a decade, with its TFR going from about two children per woman in 2010 to 1.71 in 2019 (SCB).

Part of recent fertility declines has been explained by the rise of *perceived economic uncertainty* that persisted also long after the economic recovery. Objective economic conditions do not always represent the unique rationale of childbearing decisions. Beyond the role of preferences, attitudes and social norms (Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa, 1986; Ajzen, 1991; Lesthaeghe, 2020), as well as that of institutional and structural constraints (Raz-Yurovich, 2014; Esping-Andersen and Billari, 2015; Goldscheider et al., 2015), recent research on economic uncertainty demonstrates that the subjective perception of those conditions may lead to different evaluations of current and future prospects, including those related to childbearing opportunities (Vignoli et al., 2020a, b). The recent application of the Narrative Framework to fertility decisions emphasizes the role of *time* to distinguish between objective and subjective dimensions of economic prospects. In this framework, objective conditions represent the “shadow of the past”, while subjective conditions represent “imagined futures” or “shadows of the future” (Bernardi et al., 2019: 4; Vignoli et al., 2020a: 26). Despite the ameliorating objective economic conditions in the second half of the 2010s, persisting perceived uncertainties seem to have reinforced the pessimistic evaluation of future economic prospects, which may have induced a continued postponement of irreversible transitions, such as having a child (Kreyenfeld et al. 2012; Schneider, 2015; Hofmann et al., 2017).

However, feelings of economic uncertainty cannot alone explain why fertility was still declining more than ten years after the Great Recession, including in countries like the Nordic ones, which were only marginally affected by the crisis and which had a high level of economic security in the first place

(Comolli et al., 2021). Despite the rich amount of research, the determinants of recent fertility declines remain largely unknown, perhaps because scholars have focused so much on just the purely economic consequences of the Great Recession.

Social uncertainties and social trust

One of the major tenets of the life course paradigm is that individuals do not live and take decisions in isolation but are embedded in a social context, namely in structures of social interaction which influences individual beliefs and actions (Elder, 1974; 1994; Entwisle, 2007; Huinink and Kohli, 2014). Social interaction and the associated exchange of information, services and goods between individuals is one of the most powerful determinants of reproductive decisions (Balbo et al., 2013; Balbo and Barban, 2014; Bernardi and Klärner, 2014). Individuals use social interaction as a resource to navigate complex situations (Rossier and Bernardi, 2009) and community actions serve as information from which individuals chose their own course of action (Montgomery and Casterline 1996). Not only does social interaction generate information, but it also produces resources. Such resources represent what according to Putnam (1993: 167) can be defined as *social capital*: all features of social organization that ease cooperation for the collective good. In this view, social capital represents an attribute of spaces (Sampson et al., 1999; Forrest and Kearns, 2001) as well as groups (Sampson et al., 2002; Bühler and Philipov, 2005). Social capital diffuses at the meso-level through peers and groups, and at the macro-level at different geographical scales through neighborhoods, cities, regions, or countries.

The differential impact and unequal distribution of the recovery from a recession like that of 2008 may affect social relationships between groups and individuals (Matsudaira, 2016; Moya and Fiske, 2017; Ayllon, 2019). Growing social inequalities may elicit lower social cohesion, mounting intra- and inter-generational tensions and anti-immigrant opinions (Cronin, 2013). Social psychology research shows that income inequality is a predictor of individual loneliness, short-sightedness, and low trust (Haushofer and Fehr, 2014). Political science studies demonstrate that inequality lowers the degree of social capital, civic spirit, trust, and civic engagement (e.g. volunteering and charity donations). This may happen because the greater the distance between individuals at the top and the bottom, the less the different strata share a common fate and trust each other, and because “trust rests on a psychological foundation of optimism and control over one’s own environment” (Uslaner and Brown, 2005: 869), which inequality reduces.

Other literature connects more long-term trends of deindustrialization and processes like job displacements to social consequences such as alienation, social withdrawal and lowered social participation (Linkon and Russo, 2002; Brand and Burgard, 2008). Social inequalities may be linked to processes of marginalization, increasing competition and anxiety over the maintenance of social status,

as well as lowered social trust (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009; Kearney and Levine, 2014). Economic crises threaten individuals' sense of personal control over their own opportunities. Thanks to the "human capacity to mentally extend the self to a collective" (Fritzsche et al., 2017: 119), individuals may in situations of increased uncertainty rely more heavily on group-based (age, social class, citizenship) affiliations and increase their in-group limited trust at the expense of generalized trust and broader social cohesion (Tabellini, 2010; Fritzsche et al., 2017).

Individuals can self-identify along several lines: nation, class, age, gender, religion. The identification with each social group is related to its relative position in terms of its material status and other valued characteristics (Shayo, 2009). The deteriorating position of individuals with low socioeconomic status in the wake of an economic crisis may make them more prone to shift to their national group identity instead, while the ameliorating status of a high socioeconomic position may make individuals identify more strongly with class and less with nation (Uslaner and Brown, 2005; Jesuit et al., 2009; Han, 2016). Changes of focal issues for some groups from the economic or class divide to that of civil and national-identity divides help explain the emergence of RRP (Rydgren, 2007). Declining social trust is one of the main mechanisms explaining the rise in support for RRP in Europe (Dal Bó et al., 2019).

While a high level of generalized trust instils a sense of comfort that mitigates uncertainty (Colquitt et al., 2012; Arpino and Obydenkova, 2020), the shredding of good social practices and generalized morality induces a sense of insecurity regarding the future of societies and social interactions. Individuals face a dilemma: while both individuals' and societies' outcomes are maximized by cooperation and social participation, it also makes individuals vulnerable to exploitation as some cooperative actions might not be rewarded (Kollock, 1998). This creates a sense of *social uncertainty* that pervades life, particularly during times of societal change (Lind, 2001).

Social uncertainty and fertility

While no other study has connected recent fertility declines to explicit dimensions of increasing social uncertainty, the link between generalized trust and fertility has been investigated in a few macro-level studies which illustrate that lower generalized trust in a given context is associated with lower fertility (Aassve et al., 2016, 2018, 2021). Where morality is more limited, fertility rates are lower because of lower quality of institutions (low or poor public childcare provisions, Aassve et al., 2021) and the lower likelihood of couples to outsource childcare (Aassve et al., 2016). Other micro-level studies, focusing more on patterns of social inequalities, suggest that the association between social capital and fertility is not homogenous across sociodemographic groups. For example, low social support in some groups is associated with high levels of teenage births (Gold et al., 2002; Kearney and Levine 2014) and may

induce socially disadvantaged women to reduce the spacing of births (Gold et al., 2004). In some situations, isolation and hopelessness may induce disadvantaged women to turn to motherhood as the only social role they can achieve (Friedman et al., 1994).

One limitation of previous demographic research is that different dimensions of social capital and social trust have mainly been interpreted as time-invariant fixed traits of groups or societies that are transmitted “from generation to generation” (Aassve et al., 2018: 4-5), in contrast to the abovementioned literature from social psychology and political sociology, which highlights that major crises may alter those traits. Societal changes that work to break down the social fabric and lower the levels of generalized trust represent additional sources of uncertainties, related to the future of individuals’ social support and societal values as well as the perceived future quality of social institutions. This may have a bearing on reproductive decisions that stretch far beyond that of economic unpredictability. These factors may influence family and childbearing decisions, insofar as they affect a particular view of society in the future and thus people’s willingness to invest in that future through having children.


Uncertainties about the future and the quality of future social relations may be further fueled by the emergence of partisan politics and partisan group belongings. This stems not only from the low trust in social institutions that is expressed by those who vote for or sympathize with RRP, but also from the lowered generalized trust that follows in the wake of political polarization. For example, a high level of support for RRP at the local level is to be perceived particularly alienating for those with non-RRP political views and social belongings. In our study, *we hypothesize that a high degree of partisan politics at the local level, as reflected by high levels of RRP voting, is related to depressed fertility for the general population in that context.*

To the authors’ knowledge, there is only one study that addresses the relationship between partisan political support and fertility during the Great Recession. Morgan et al. (2011) show that after the 2008 presidential election in the United States, the negative association between unemployment and fertility rates was weaker in states where the support for Obama was larger. The authors interpret this as evidence that partisan perceptions regarding the severity of the crisis – more optimistic in states with greater Democratic support, and more pessimistic in states with greater Republican support – influenced fertility decisions (Morgan et al., 2011: 10). The role of partisan voting as a reflection of social uncertainty and the lack of social trust in the aftermath of a major crisis, and its role in determining a persistent decline in childbearing, however, has never been explored.

Research questions and Hypotheses on Partisan voting and fertility decline in Sweden

In this study, we use Sweden as a case to focus on the declining generalized trust and increasing social uncertainty that is reflected in growing political support for RRP and link it to childbearing trends observed in the last decade. Figure 1 shows the trends in Total Fertility Rates in Sweden since 1970 including the decline that occurred since 2010 (left panel). It also shows the vote share of the Swedish RRP, the Sweden Democrats (SD), in the national elections that were held in 2006, 2010 and 2014 (right panel). The box plot demonstrates the variation in the SD voting share across municipalities in Sweden. The overall share of votes for SD increased from 2.9% in the 2006 elections to 12.9% in the 2014 elections; it increased further to 17.5% in the national elections that were held in 2018. The period of increasing voter support for SD coincided with a political landscape where the government shifted in 2006 from being held by the Social Democrats to a coalition of conservative and liberal parties, and back to a government dominated by the Social Democrats in 2014. During this study period the Sweden Democrats were marginalized by the traditional political parties in Swedish policy making and had very little, if any, direct political influence.


Figure 1: Swedish TFR 1970-2019 and Municipality share of votes for Sweden Democrats in 2006, 2010 and 2014 elections



Source: elaboration of the authors based on Statistics Sweden data. Dotted horizontal lines in the right hand graph represent means of SD vote share in each election.

Figure 2 illustrates that between 2009 and 2017 both generalized trust and the sense of control over one's life (left panel) declined somewhat in Sweden, albeit from relatively high levels (data from the EVS). Figure 2 also illustrates that the decline in generalized trust appears to have been greater in regions in non-metropolitan Central Sweden (Norra and Östra Mellansverige, and Småland with Öland-Gotland). According to Dal Bó et al. (2019), these were also the regions where the SD was most successful in increasing its vote share over the period 2002-2014.

Figure 2: Generalized trust and sense of control over own life in Sweden (1990-2017) and Generalized trust change by Swedish regions (2009 and 2017)



Source: elaboration of the authors based on European Value Survey data.

Our study focusses explicitly on the role of the political landscape and that of partisan voting as an expression of social uncertainty and dis-content at the municipality level. Bivariate correlations between the regional SD vote share (Statistics Sweden) and indicators of individual generalized trust and control (EVS data 1998-2017) are negative (not shown). Similarly, increases in the vote share for the SD in Swedish municipalities are correlated with the decline in total fertility in these municipalities (data from Statistics Sweden, not shown).

Our assumption is hence that political sentiments as expressed in the support for SD, net of other economic or social determinants that are correlated with RRP support (e.g., poverty, job polarization, social inequality, migration) represent an indicator of social uncertainty and declining generalized trust in the local area of residence. Following this assumption, our first research question asks whether increasing voter support for SD in the aftermath of the Great Recession has contributed to the fertility decline in Sweden. The first hypothesis tested is that residing in a municipality with increasing support for the SD exposes women to an environment which induces them to postpone or forego having children (H1).

However, we may expect heterogenous effects across socio-economic groups. Therefore, our second research question addresses whether and how the association between rising SD support in the municipality of residence and women's probability of having a child differs across socioeconomic groups. The support for SD has been shown to be higher among the less educated and among men. Consequently, the negative impact of a local environment with increasingly high levels of RRP support may be felt more strongly among women with a high educational attainment (H2).

Data and Variables

We use Swedish register data to construct complete individual-level fertility histories of all Swedish-born women in the reproductive age range of 15-44 years that were resident in Sweden in the period 2006-2017 (N=1,901,013). Swedish registers bring annual information on educational attainment, individual and family disposable income, employment status and type of occupation, civil status, fertility and other demographic characteristics. We link each woman to the share of votes obtained by the Sweden Democrats (SD) in her municipality of residence (N=290) in the three election years 2006, 2010 and 2014 (Statistics Sweden).

Our main explanatory variable is the share of votes obtained by the Sweden Democrats (SD) in a woman's municipality of residence (we have of course no information on her own voting behavior). We present a set of step-wise models where different individual-level and municipality-level characteristics are considered. Depending on the model specification, we use the share of SD votes both as a continuous variable as categorized in terciles by election (low, middle, high support)¹. The fertility models control for age and previous parity, woman's educational attainment (primary or lower secondary, upper secondary, tertiary, missing²), employment status (employed, self-employed, no income statement, in education) and, in some models, women's residential moves between municipalities. We do not control for civil status because marriage in Sweden tends to follow childbirth rather than the other way around (Ohlsson-Wijk et al., 2020). We additionally control for time-varying municipality characteristics that might affect both the rise in SD votes and fertility decisions: population size and the share of foreign-born population (calculated from the register data at hand). We control for the broader political sentiment in the municipality as reflected by conservative ideology using the Moderate Party share of votes, the traditional right-wing party in Sweden. Finally, since we are interested in the effect of social trust and social inequality, we add several indicators of economic inequality at the municipality level. We control for the Gini income inequality index (calculated from the income data in available registers) and the share of manufacturing jobs in the municipality³ as a measure of job polarization. We control for municipalities' unemployment rate gathered from job-seeking and activation-policy registers (Statistic Sweden)⁴. Because overall period trends may influence

¹ We need to identify terciles within elections and not overall terciles because, since the support for SD increased in every municipality in Sweden over the elections considered, there are zero municipalities in the lowest overall tercile in the most recent election.

² The information on educational level is missing on 0.73% of observations (see Table A.1)

³ Labor market polarization and the disappearance of goods-producing industries, due to outsourcing and automation, makes displaced workers move to the low-skilled service sector, which provides jobs with fewer hours, lower pay and with scarcer benefits (Kalleberg 2009; Seltzer 2019). The hollowing out of the middle of the occupational income distribution results in decreased financial security of workers (Seltzer 2019). In a recent paper, Seltzer (2019) shows that labor market polarization in the US influences TFR in all ethnic groups but in particular among the most disadvantaged ethnicities (African American and Hispanic).

⁴ As a robustness check we also consider regional (N=21) unemployment rates (Statistic Sweden) and the non-employment rate in their labor market area (N=73) of residence (Statistic Sweden). Non-employment rates are based on income registers: if no income is reported in a given year, the person is considered not working.

both the support for SD and the probability of having children, we also control for time trends with year dummies. All control variables are lagged one year so that they are measured at the time the decision to have a child was taken.

Method

We use individual fixed effects linear probability models⁵ to estimate how changes over time in the exposure to the support for SD in the municipality of residence influences women's probability of childbirth, net of observed and time invariant unobserved individual characteristics. In some model specifications, when we control for women's migration between municipalities, we also include municipality fixed effects to control for further unobserved factors that make some municipalities more likely to register higher support for the SD and also a high or low probability of having children.

Multilevel models are standard in applications with hierarchical data as ours (three levels: women, observed over time, nested in municipalities) and assume that unobserved heterogeneity at higher levels are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in the model. However, both individuals and municipalities are likely to possess certain unobserved traits that influence both the SD voting, the propensity of people to live or move to certain municipalities and the chance of having children. As results do not differ when controlling for women's residential moves instead of using municipalities' dummies, we opted for the first specification when considering this relationship. This produces a more parsimonious model, but as robustness check, we also ran a within-individual, within-municipality model (Andrews et al., 2006). Moreover, our theoretical hypothesis is that changes over time in the support for the SD is likely to reduce fertility, but that overall levels of support may, on the contrary, perhaps be related to higher fertility as they may reflect more traditional or nativist views in the municipality, and thus higher fertility levels. The best model to test our hypothesis is, therefore, a within-individual model. For the sake of completeness, we also report cross-sectional results from pooled OLS regression models in our Appendix.

Equation (1) illustrates the fixed effects model. Our dependent variable is the probability of (any) birth at time t to woman i residing in municipality k , and the main explanatory variable is the share of votes in municipality k experienced by woman i , at time t . X_{it} represents individual level time-varying controls, Z_{kt} represents municipality-level time-varying controls and μ_i, τ_k represent, respectively, individual and municipality (not included in all models) fixed effects.

⁵ Logistic models yield identical predicted probabilities of childbirth.

$$Pr(birth)_{ikt} = \alpha + \beta SD_{ikt} + X_{it} + Z_{kt} + \mu_i + \tau_k + t + \varepsilon_{ikt} \quad (1)$$

In an alternative specification we utilize a Difference-in-difference approach, comparing the period difference in the probability of having a child in a high SD-vote municipality, minus the period difference in the probability of birth in a low SD-vote municipality. This is provided by the interaction term in Eq. (2) where SD_T_{ik} is the categorical variable of the SD terciles vote share and t_{ik} is the categorical variable representing the three post-election periods. The other factors in Eq. (2) are the same as in (1), except for the time trend variable that is now dropped because of the period variable absorbing all the change in the SD main explanatory variable.

$$Pr(birth)_{ik} = \alpha + \beta SD_T_{ik} + \gamma t_{ik} + \delta(SD_T_{ik} * t_{ik}) + X_i + Z_k + \mu_i + \tau_k + \varepsilon_{ikt} \quad (2)$$

Finally, we study how the relationship between partisan support for Sweden Democrats (SD) and childbearing varies by women's educational level, by adding a three-way interaction. Results are presented graphically through predicted probabilities of childbirth. Full models are reported in the Appendix of the paper.


Results

While pooled cross-sectional models do not distinguish between differences between and within individuals or between and within municipalities, it is useful to include them as a benchmark for within-individual and within-municipality models. Table A.2 in the Appendix shows that in the pooled sample, the association between a higher support for the Sweden Democrats in the municipality of residence and the probability of having a child is negative when women's characteristics and year dummies are controlled for (Models 1 and 2 of Table A.2). The association though becomes positive (but weaker) once also other municipality-level determinants of RRP support are controlled for (Model 3 of Table A.2). Thus, when we consider compositional differences both within and between municipalities including some of the municipality factors that drive the support for RRP, the childbearing probability is actually slightly higher in municipalities in which the SD vote share is larger. This may not be surprising as, first, individuals tend to sort into specific areas based on their preferences, which include both political and family preferences. Second, areas with greater support for right wing and nativist parties may have certain other characteristics, which may not be captured by the variables included in the pooled model and which affect SD voting and fertility in the same direction.

In our study design, our main hypothesis rather concerns the variation over time in partisan voting and individuals' exposure to such changes in their local political context. Results from our within-individual

(and, in one case, within-municipality), fixed-effects models (Table A.3) indeed suggest that the probability of having a child declines as women are exposed to an increasing support for SD in their municipality (Fig. 3, based on Model 3 of Table A.3), net of women's and municipalities observed (time-varying) and women's unobserved (time invariant) characteristics. The consideration of municipality fixed-effects (Model 4 of Table A.3) makes the effect of an increasing vote share for the SD even stronger. Point estimates from fixed effects models with different degrees of controls (Models 1-4 of Table A.3) suggest that for **about a 10 percentage points increase in municipality vote share for SD, the probability of childbirth declines about 1.5-4 percentage points** (with a baseline annual probability of childbirth of around 15%).

Figure 3: Predicted probability of childbirth by municipality vote share for SD. Fixed effects model.




Source: elaboration of the authors based on Statistics Sweden data. Note: Predicted change in probability of birth for a hypothetical woman. All controls at mean values.

Table A.4 illustrates results from the difference in difference model which confirm this finding. Model 3 of Table A.4 shows that among women living in municipalities that throughout the period remain in the *lowest tercile of support for SD*, the probability of birth decreased in the period 2006-2014 (-0.00365) but increased in 2015-2017 (0.00621). This provides an indication of what could have been the trend in the probability of childbirth across municipalities, had the support for the SD not increased so much. In contrast, women residing in municipalities that in all three periods report the *highest tercile of support for SD*, display a steeper decline in the probability of childbirth (-0.0042) and no recuperation during 2015-2017 (0.00621-0.01367). If one looks within municipalities (Model 4 of Table A.4), the probability of birth also decreases in 2015-2017 (-0.00137) for municipalities with the lowest support for SD but again it drops much more strongly in municipalities with highest support for SD (-0.00137-

0.01376). In line with the results from the linear models above, these estimates suggest that **had the sharp increase in SD support not happened the probability of childbirth among women living in those municipalities would have been 1.4 percentage points higher** (see point estimates in Models 3-4 of Table A.4).

Finally, we find large differences in outcomes across socioeconomic groups (Fig. 4, based on Model 5 of Table A.3; see also Model 5 of Table A.4). Among low educated women, the probability of childbirth remains low during the period, irrespectively of the SD vote share. If anything, the probability of childbirth slightly increases with rising support for the SD in the municipality of residence but only up to a vote share around 10%. The strongest decline in the probability of having a child in relation to rising support for the SD in the local municipality appears among tertiary educated women.

Figure 4: Predicted probability of childbirth by municipality vote share for SD. Fixed effects model.



Source: elaboration of the authors based on Statistics Sweden and Swedish register data. Note: Predicted change in probability of birth for a hypothetical woman. All controls at mean values.

Conclusions

In our study, we focused on Sweden and a decade-long period of declining birth rates and increasing support for the radical right party of Sweden, the Sweden Democrats, which are two new trends that have followed in the wake of the Great Recession of 2008-09. We take the increasing support for the Sweden Democrats as a reflection of increasing feelings of uncertainties and a climate of declining general trust, something that we expect could have had a negative bearing on fertility rates. By means of fixed effects and difference in difference methods, we show that trends of increasing support for the Sweden Democrats in local municipalities indeed seem to have had a negative impact on Swedish

women's propensities to have a child. Remarkably similar estimates from different model specifications show that the 10 percentage points increase in the vote share for Sweden Democrats between 2006 and 2014 was associated with a 1.5-4 percentage points drop in the 15-percent annual probability of having a child. We additionally show that there are *heterogenous effects among social groups*: no effects among women with low educational attainment and a strong negative effect among women with the highest educational attainment. The latter finding is logical as highly educated women are less likely than other groups in society to actually support the Sweden Democrats themselves, but may be more strongly affected by being exposed to a local context that provides little of positive images of a future in which to raise a child.

The magnitude of effects of our voting-support variable is similar to those observed for a more conventional and much more common indicator of uncertainties in society, i.e., that of the association between increases in unemployment rates and fertility (Sobotka et al., 2011; Goldstein et al., 2013; Comolli, 2017). Our study suggest that fertility researchers would benefit from paying better attention to other aspects of societal uncertainties than those reflected by economic conditions alone. A focus on political discomfort and the role of declining trust in political and other social institutions may be rewarding. Rising social uncertainties in the aftermath of the Great Recession had many expressions, and here we show that one of them, rising support for Radical Right Parties appear to be connected to the recent trend of declining birth rates.

Our study has bearings also for other contexts than that of Sweden. Fertility declines in other societies may be linked to similar social and political developments as those observed here. The trends with increasing support for Radical Right Parties and simultaneous declines in fertility during a context of increasing uncertainties have been observed for a wide range of countries. As a matter of fact, recent fertility declines in developed societies appear to have been the strongest during the late 2010s period of Trumpism and the related political strife as expressed in the U.S. and with percussions for the political climate across developed and less developed societies.

At the time of writing, the world is about to recover from another intervention which caused a lot of new uncertainties during 2020-21, i.e., that of the Covid-19 pandemic. Curiously, the handling of that pandemic has caused varying situations of increasing or decreasing trust in how governments and authorities have handled the new and unexpected situation. In most countries, it seems not to have been followed by continued increases in the support for Radical Right parties. In some countries, the political climate may perhaps be turning slightly less aggressive. It remains to be seen in what directions feelings of generalized trust and political discontent will develop in the aftermath of the global pandemic, and if such trends may have any bearing on fertility trends.

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Table A.1: Summary statistics

	N	Mean/proportion	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
Unemployment rate (%)	15,400,201	7.13	2.86	1.2	19.55
Population municipality (in ten thousand)	15,400,201	15.89	22.80	0.26	75.74
Share of foreign-born population (%)	15,400,201	11.93	6.01	2.23	37.77
Gini index	15,400,201	0.38	0.04	0.28	0.68
Share of manufacturing workers (%)	15,400,201	9.78	6.43	0	76.30
Moderate party Vote Share (%)	15,400,201	27.11	7.80	6.90	59.70
Age	15,400,201	28.89	8.56	15	44
SD Vote Share (%)	15,400,201	6.46	4.82	0.30	30
Childbirth					
Birth a child in year X	911,576	5.92			
No child born in year X	14,488,625	94.08			
	15,400,201	100.00			
SD Vote Share Terciles					
SD% lowest tercile in election X	5,488,529	35.64			
SD% mid tercile in election X	4,917,642	31.93			
SD% highest tercile in election X	4,994,030	32.43			
	15,400,201	100.00			
Educational level					
Primary or Lower Secondary education	3,119,621	20.26			
Upper Secondary education	6,228,410	40.44			
Tertiary education	5,940,198	38.57			
Missing education	111,972	0.73			
	15,400,201	100.00			
Employment status					
Employed	10,175,100	66.07			
Self-Employed	385,728	2.50			
Not employed	4,839,373	31.42			
	15,400,201	100.00			
Previous parity					
0	10,383,096	67.42			
1	3,547,254	23.03			
2	1,164,770	7.56			
3	230,743	1.50			
4	74,338	0.48			
	15,400,201	100.00			
Period					
2007-2010	5,692,185	36.96			
2011-2014	5,597,872	36.35			
2015-2017	4,110,144	26.69			
	15,400,201	100.00			
Residential move					
Did not change municipality of residence	14,342,423	93.13			
Changed municipality of residence	1,057,778	6.87			
	15,400,201	100.00			

Source: elaboration of the authors based on Statistics Sweden data. Note: Terciles in 2006 election are 0.3-2.2%; 2.3-2.9%; 3-10.3%. Terciles in 2010 election are 1.7-4.8%; 4.9-5.9%; 6-15.8%. Terciles in 2014 election are 5.3-9.8%; 10.1-13.9%; 14-30%.

Table A.2: Probability of having a child. Cross-sectional models.

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
SD Vote Share (%)	-0.00237*** (-0.00249 - -0.00226)	-0.00087*** (-0.00098 - -0.00076)	0.00046*** (0.00034 - 0.00059)	0.00107*** (0.00091 - 0.00123)
SD Vote Share (%) squared	0.00006*** (0.00006 - 0.00007)	0.00003*** (0.00003 - 0.00004)	0.00000 (-0.00000 - 0.00001)	-0.00001*** (-0.00002 - -0.00001)
Unemployment rate (%)			0.00026*** (0.00019 - 0.00034)	0.00033*** (0.00025 - 0.00040)
Population municipality (in ten thousand)			0.00027*** (0.00026 - 0.00028)	0.00027*** (0.00026 - 0.00027)
Share of foreign-born population (%)			0.00026*** (0.00023 - 0.00029)	0.00026*** (0.00023 - 0.00029)
Gini index			-0.04996*** (-0.05618 - -0.04375)	-0.05248*** (-0.05869 - -0.04627)
Share of manufacturing workers (%)			-0.00008*** (-0.00010 - -0.00005)	-0.00006*** (-0.00009 - -0.00004)
Moderate party Vote Share (%)			0.00011*** (0.00007 - 0.00014)	0.00012*** (0.00009 - 0.00015)
Residential move		0.01777*** (0.01724 - 0.01830)	0.01807*** (0.01754 - 0.01860)	0.01813*** (0.01760 - 0.01866)
Education (REF: Upper Secondary education)				
Primary or Lower Secondary education		-0.03079*** (-0.03116 - -0.03043)	-0.03059*** (-0.03095 - -0.03022)	-0.03099*** (-0.03171 - -0.03028)
Tertiary education		0.03229*** (0.03201 - 0.03258)	0.03095*** (0.03066 - 0.03124)	0.04052*** (0.03975 - 0.04130)
Missing education		-0.00216*** (-0.00317 - -0.00116)	-0.00214*** (-0.00314 - -0.00113)	-0.00701*** (-0.00935 - -0.00467)
Primary or Lower Sec education *SD Vote Share (%)				0.00018** (0.00001 - 0.00035)
Tertiary education*SD Vote Share (%)				-0.00181*** (-0.00201 - -0.00161)
Missing education*SD Vote Share (%)				0.00119*** (0.00066 - 0.00172)
Primary or Lower Sec education *SD Vote Share squared (%)				-0.00001** (-0.00002 - -0.00000)
Tertiary education*SD Vote Share squared (%)				0.00003*** (0.00002 - 0.00004)
Missing education*SD Vote Share squared (%)				-0.00005*** (-0.00007 - -0.00002)
Employment status (REF: Employed)				
Self-Employed		0.00127*** (0.00044 - 0.00210)	0.00074* (-0.00009 - 0.00157)	0.00076* (-0.00007 - 0.00158)
Not employed		-0.04185*** (-0.04215 - -0.04155)	-0.04162*** (-0.04192 - -0.04132)	-0.04163*** (-0.04193 - -0.04133)
Age (mean-centered)	-0.00198*** (-0.00200 - -0.00197)	-0.00463*** (-0.00465 - -0.00461)	-0.00466*** (-0.00469 - -0.00464)	-0.00466*** (-0.00468 - -0.00464)
Parity (REF: Previous parity 1)				
Previous parity 0	-0.07929*** (-0.07961 - -0.07898)	-0.08345*** (-0.08377 - -0.08313)	-0.08552*** (-0.08585 - -0.08520)	-0.08566*** (-0.08599 - -0.08534)
Previous parity 2	0.00543*** (0.00492 - 0.00594)	0.01174*** (0.01123 - 0.01224)	0.01231*** (0.01181 - 0.01282)	0.01227*** (0.01176 - 0.01278)
Previous parity 3	0.02066*** (0.01951 - 0.02181)	0.03771*** (0.03655 - 0.03886)	0.03831*** (0.03716 - 0.03946)	0.03821*** (0.03706 - 0.03936)
Previous parity 4	0.06371*** (0.06097 - 0.06646)	0.09437*** (0.09158 - 0.09716)	0.09493*** (0.09215 - 0.09772)	0.09475*** (0.09197 - 0.09753)
Municipality FE	NO	NO	NO	NO
Year dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constant	0.11500*** (0.11445 - 0.11556)	0.12142*** (0.12084 - 0.12199)	0.12694*** (0.12515 - 0.12872)	0.12388*** (0.12206 - 0.12569)
Observations	15,400,201	15,400,201	15,400,201	15,400,201
R-squared	0.01801	0.03445	0.03506	0.03520

Source: elaboration of the authors based on Statistics Sweden data.

Table A.3: Probability of having a child. Fixed effects models.

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)
SD Vote Share (%)	-0.00433*** (-0.00455 - -0.00412)	-0.00306*** (-0.00327 - -0.00285)	-0.00152*** (-0.00176 - -0.00129)	-0.00253*** (-0.00284 - -0.00222)	-0.00105*** (-0.00131 - -0.00079)
SD Vote Share (%) squared	0.00007*** (0.00006 - 0.00007)	0.00004*** (0.00004 - 0.00005)	0.00001*** (0.00000 - 0.00002)	0.00002*** (0.00001 - 0.00003)	0.00000 (-0.00000 - 0.00001)
Unemployment rate (%)			0.00142*** (0.00129 - 0.00155)	0.00249*** (0.00232 - 0.00266)	0.00168*** (0.00155 - 0.00181)
Population municipality (in ten thousand)			0.00050*** (0.00048 - 0.00052)	0.01535*** (0.01061 - 0.02008)	0.00048*** (0.00046 - 0.00050)
Share of foreign-born population (%)			0.00062*** (0.00054 - 0.00070)	-0.00036 (-0.00086 - 0.00015)	0.00060*** (0.00052 - 0.00068)
Gini index			-0.07214*** (-0.08479 - -0.05950)	-0.03091*** (-0.05017 - -0.01165)	-0.08585*** (-0.09850 - -0.07319)
Share of manufacturing workers (%)			0.00012*** (0.00007 - 0.00016)	-0.00015*** (-0.00020 - -0.00009)	0.00016*** (0.00012 - 0.00020)
Moderate party Vote Share (%)			0.00043*** (0.00036 - 0.00050)	-0.00041*** (-0.00054 - -0.00029)	0.00051*** (0.00044 - 0.00058)
Residential move		0.01426*** (0.01369 - 0.01483)	0.01412*** (0.01354 - 0.01469)		0.01377*** (0.01320 - 0.01435)
Education (REF: Upper Secondary education)					
Primary or Lower Sec education		-0.03171*** (-0.03212 - -0.03130)	-0.03109*** (-0.03150 - -0.03068)	-0.03435*** (-0.03477 - -0.03394)	-0.03788*** (-0.03880 - -0.03696)
Tertiary education		0.05419*** (0.05366 - 0.05472)	0.05218*** (0.05165 - 0.05272)	0.05321*** (0.05266 - 0.05375)	0.07627*** (0.07512 - 0.07742)
Missing education		-0.01821*** (-0.02037 - -0.01606)	-0.01771*** (-0.01987 - -0.01556)	-0.02006*** (-0.02222 - -0.01790)	-0.05248*** (-0.05590 - -0.04907)
Primary or Lower Sec education *SD Vote Share (%)					0.00294*** (0.00270 - 0.00317)
Tertiary education*SD Vote Share (%)					-0.00416*** (-0.00441 - -0.00391)
Missing education*SD Vote Share (%)					0.00829*** (0.00768 - 0.00891)
Primary or Lower Sec education *SD Vote Share squared (%)					-0.00008*** (-0.00009 - -0.00007)
Tertiary education*SD Vote Share squared (%)					0.00009*** (0.00008 - 0.00010)
Missing education*SD Vote Share squared (%)					-0.00021*** (-0.00024 - -0.00019)
Employment status (REF: Employed)					
Self-Employed		-0.00728*** (-0.00862 - -0.00593)	-0.00687*** (-0.00821 - -0.00552)	-0.00695*** (-0.00829 - -0.00560)	-0.00680*** (-0.00815 - -0.00545)
Not employed		-0.03987*** (-0.04025 - -0.03950)	-0.03898*** (-0.03935 - -0.03860)	-0.03807*** (-0.03845 - -0.03770)	-0.03943*** (-0.03981 - -0.03905)
Age (mean-centered)	-0.00158*** (-0.00170 - -0.00145)	-0.00709*** (-0.00723 - -0.00696)	-0.00794*** (-0.00811 - -0.00776)	-0.00792*** (-0.00814 - -0.00770)	-0.00741*** (-0.00758 - -0.00724)
Parity (REF: Previous parity 1)					
Previous parity 0	-0.14343*** (-0.14414 - -0.14272)	-0.15992*** (-0.16063 - -0.15921)	-0.16260*** (-0.16332 - -0.16189)	-0.16226*** (-0.16298 - -0.16155)	-0.16513*** (-0.16584 - -0.16442)
Previous parity 2	0.07399*** (0.07253 - 0.07544)	0.08700*** (0.08553 - 0.08846)	0.08805*** (0.08659 - 0.08951)	0.08843*** (0.08697 - 0.08990)	0.08918*** (0.08772 - 0.09064)
Previous parity 3	0.15097*** (0.14761 - 0.15432)	0.17513*** (0.17175 - 0.17851)	0.17639*** (0.17300 - 0.17977)	0.17727*** (0.17389 - 0.18066)	0.17607*** (0.17269 - 0.17945)
Previous parity 4	0.22496*** (0.21808 - 0.23184)	0.26147*** (0.25453 - 0.26840)	0.26267*** (0.25573 - 0.26960)	0.26424*** (0.25729 - 0.27118)	0.25936*** (0.25243 - 0.26629)
Municipality FE	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO
Year dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constant	0.17406*** (0.17275 - 0.17537)	0.16930*** (0.16796 - 0.17064)	0.15363*** (0.14924 - 0.15803)	0.13803*** (0.11846 - 0.15761)	0.15313*** (0.14871 - 0.15754)
Observations	15,400,201	15,400,201	15,400,201	15,400,201	15,400,201
R-squared	0.01805	0.02597	0.02665	0.02696	0.02726
Number of Id	1,901,013	1,901,013	1,901,013	1,901,013	1,901,013

Source: elaboration of the authors based on Statistics Sweden data.

Table A.4: Probability of having a child. Difference in Difference FE model.

		Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)
SD Vote Share (REF: Low Tercile)	SD Vote Share (%) Mid Tercile	-0.00787*** (-0.00865 - -0.00709)	-0.00571*** (-0.00648 - -0.00495)	-0.00221*** (-0.00299 - -0.00142)	-0.00318*** (-0.00406 - -0.00231)	0.00145** (0.00031 - 0.00259)
	SD Vote Share (%) High Tercile	-0.01142*** (-0.01227 - -0.01058)	-0.00710*** (-0.00793 - -0.00627)	-0.00078* (-0.00165 - 0.00010)	-0.00469*** (-0.00571 - -0.00366)	0.00290*** (0.00169 - 0.00410)
	Education (REF: Upper Secondary education)					
	Primary or Lower Sec education		-0.03177*** (-0.03218 - -0.03136)	-0.03114*** (-0.03154 - -0.03073)	-0.03432*** (-0.03473 - -0.03391)	-0.02838*** (-0.02932 - -0.02745)
	Tertiary education		0.05404*** (0.05351 - 0.05457)	0.05199*** (0.05146 - 0.05253)	0.05314*** (0.05260 - 0.05368)	0.07101*** (0.06975 - 0.07227)
	Missing education		-0.01830*** (-0.02045 - -0.01615)	-0.01773*** (-0.01988 - -0.01557)	-0.02006*** (-0.02222 - -0.01790)	-0.03262*** (-0.03665 - -0.02859)
Period (REF: 2006-2010)	2011-2014	-0.00204*** (-0.00270 - -0.00138)	-0.00168*** (-0.00234 - -0.00102)	-0.00365*** (-0.00434 - -0.00296)	-0.00312*** (-0.00388 - -0.00237)	-0.00100** (-0.00197 - -0.00003)
	2015-2017	0.00652*** (0.00551 - 0.00753)	0.00372*** (0.00271 - 0.00473)	0.00621*** (0.00507 - 0.00734)	-0.00137** (-0.00262 - -0.00012)	0.01344*** (0.01203 - 0.01486)
	SD Vote Share (%) Mid Tercile*2011-2014	0.00042 (-0.00041 - 0.00126)	0.00014 (-0.00069 - 0.00097)	-0.00130*** (-0.00215 - -0.00046)	0.00152*** (0.00061 - 0.00242)	-0.00312*** (-0.00442 - -0.00183)
	SD Vote Share (%) Mid Tercile*2015-2017	-0.01027*** (-0.01131 - -0.00923)	-0.00972*** (-0.01075 - -0.00869)	-0.00909*** (-0.01016 - -0.00803)	-0.00842*** (-0.00955 - -0.00730)	-0.00960*** (-0.01118 - -0.00802)
	SD Vote Share (%) High Tercile*2011-2014	-0.00239*** (-0.00319 - -0.00160)	-0.00147*** (-0.00226 - -0.00068)	-0.00420*** (-0.00503 - -0.00337)	-0.00110** (-0.00202 - -0.00018)	-0.00590*** (-0.00716 - -0.00465)
	SD Vote Share (%) High Tercile*2015-2017	-0.01519*** (-0.01620 - -0.01418)	-0.01282*** (-0.01382 - -0.01182)	-0.01367*** (-0.01478 - -0.01256)	-0.01376*** (-0.01494 - -0.01258)	-0.01523*** (-0.01683 - -0.01363)
	SD Vote Share (%) Mid Tercile*Primary or Lower Sec education					-0.00624*** (-0.00758 - -0.00491)
	SD Vote Share (%) Mid Tercile*Tertiary education					-0.00531*** (-0.00708 - -0.00353)
	SD Vote Share (%) Mid Tercile*Missing education					-0.00575** (-0.01100 - -0.00049)
	SD Vote Share (%) High Tercile*Primary or Lower Sec education					-0.01156*** (-0.01288 - -0.01024)
	SD Vote Share (%) High Tercile* Tertiary education					0.00000 (-0.00185 - 0.00185)
	SD Vote Share (%) High Tercile*Missing education					-0.00516* (-0.01082 - 0.00049)
	2011-2014*Primary or Lower Sec education					0.01623*** (0.01502 - 0.01743)
	2011-2014*Tertiary education					-0.01458*** (-0.01590 - -0.01326)
	2011-2014*Missing education					0.02814*** (0.02443 - 0.03185)
	2015-2017*Primary or Lower Sec education					0.01611*** (0.01435 - 0.01787)
	2015-2017*Tertiary education					-0.02278*** (-0.02437 - -0.02119)
	2015-2017*Missing education					0.04555*** (0.04127 - 0.04982)
	SD Vote Share (%) Mid Tercile*2011-2014*Primary or Lower Sec education					0.00190** (0.00016 - 0.00364)
	SD Vote Share (%) Mid Tercile*2011-2014*Tertiary education					0.00125 (-0.00075 - 0.00325)
	SD Vote Share (%) Mid Tercile*2011-2014*Missing education					0.00620** (0.00037 - 0.01203)
	SD Vote Share (%) Mid Tercile*2015-2017*Primary or Lower Sec education					0.00851*** (0.00609 - 0.01093)
	SD Vote Share (%) Mid Tercile*2015-2017*Tertiary education					-0.00509*** (-0.00742 - -0.00276)
	SD Vote Share (%) Mid Tercile*2015-2017*Missing education					0.01157*** (0.00511 - 0.01804)
	SD Vote Share (%) High Tercile*2011-2014*Primary or Lower Sec education					0.00360*** (0.00188 - 0.00531)
	SD Vote Share (%) High Tercile*2011-2014*Tertiary education					-0.00453*** (-0.00651 - -0.00255)
	SD Vote Share (%) High Tercile*2011-2014*Missing education					0.00205 (-0.00345 - 0.00754)
	SD Vote Share (%) High Tercile*2015-2017*Primary or Lower Sec education					0.01024*** (0.00780 - 0.01268)
	SD Vote Share (%) High Tercile*2015-2017*Tertiary education					-0.01262*** (-0.01496 - -0.01028)
	SD Vote Share (%) High Tercile*2015-2017*Missing education					0.01235*** (0.00637 - 0.01833)
Residential move			0.01433*** (0.01375 - 0.01490)	0.01426*** (0.01369 - 0.01484)		0.01359*** (0.01302 - 0.01417)
Unemployment rate (%)				0.00135*** (0.00125 - 0.00145)	0.00178*** (0.00167 - 0.00189)	0.00121*** (0.00111 - 0.00131)
Population municipality (in ten thousand)				0.00048*** (0.00047 - 0.00050)	0.01719*** (0.01243 - 0.02194)	0.00047*** (0.00046 - 0.00049)
Share of foreign-born population (%)				0.00064*** (0.00056 - 0.00071)	-0.00003 (-0.00053 - 0.00048)	0.00060*** (0.00053 - 0.00068)
Gini index				-0.05996*** (-0.07110 - -0.04881)	0.01622*** (0.00115 - 0.03130)	-0.06288*** (-0.07402 - -0.05175)
Share of manufacturing workers (%)				0.00003 (-0.00002 - 0.00007)	-0.00022*** (-0.00028 - -0.00016)	0.00006*** (0.00002 - 0.00011)
Moderate party Vote Share (%)				0.00040*** (0.00033 - 0.00046)	-0.00076*** (-0.00090 - -0.00063)	0.00036*** (0.00029 - 0.00042)
Employment status (REF: Employed)	Self-Employed		-0.00720*** (-0.00855 - -0.00586)	-0.00691*** (-0.00826 - -0.00556)	-0.00696*** (-0.00830 - -0.00561)	-0.00685*** (-0.00820 - -0.00550)
	Not employed		-0.03974*** (-0.04012 - -0.03937)	-0.03899*** (-0.03936 - -0.03861)	-0.03810*** (-0.03848 - -0.03772)	-0.03951*** (-0.03988 - -0.03913)
Age (mean-centered)		-0.00441*** (-0.00452 - -0.00430)	-0.00884*** (-0.00895 - -0.00872)	-0.00928*** (-0.00940 - -0.00917)	-0.00945*** (-0.00957 - -0.00933)	-0.00899*** (-0.00911 - -0.00887)
Parity (REF: Previous parity 1)	Previous parity 0	-0.14348*** (-0.14419 - -0.14277)	-0.15996*** (-0.16067 - -0.15925)	-0.16262*** (-0.16333 - -0.16191)	-0.16228*** (-0.16299 - -0.16156)	-0.16570*** (-0.16641 - -0.16499)
	Previous parity 2	0.07406*** (0.07260 - 0.07551)	0.08708*** (0.08561 - 0.08854)	0.08813*** (0.08667 - 0.08959)	0.08844*** (0.08698 - 0.08990)	0.08957*** (0.08811 - 0.09103)
	Previous parity 3	0.15104*** (0.14768 - 0.15440)	0.17526*** (0.17188 - 0.17865)	0.17657*** (0.17319 - 0.17996)	0.17728*** (0.17390 - 0.18067)	0.17626*** (0.17288 - 0.17965)
	Previous parity 4	0.22496*** (0.21808 - 0.23184)	0.26161*** (0.25468 - 0.26855)	0.26300*** (0.25606 - 0.26994)	0.26424*** (0.25729 - 0.27118)	0.25890*** (0.25196 - 0.26584)
	Municipality FE	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO
Constant		0.15273*** (0.15193 - 0.15354)	0.15596*** (0.15513 - 0.15679)	0.14206*** (0.13848 - 0.14564)	0.11301*** (0.09392 - 0.13211)	0.13993*** (0.13630 - 0.14355)
Observations		15,400,201	15,400,201	15,400,201	15,400,201	15,400,201
R-squared		0.01810	0.02601	0.02669	0.02697	0.02758
Number of id		1,901,013	1,901,013	1,901,013	1,901,013	1,901,013

Source: elaboration of the authors based on Statistics Sweden data.

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