



Israel's Long and Winding Road to a Second Demographic Transition

A Study on Attitudes in Accordance with the Second Demographic Transition in Israel 2009-2019

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Abstract

This cross-sectional study focuses on attitudes in accordance with the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) in the adult population of Israel. Such attitudes are expressed by favoring an establishment of a family at older ages and favoring a small family size. Such attitudes are also expressed by supporting certain forms of living arrangements that are alternative to marriage. Based on results from Israel's Social Survey (ISS), it seems that during 2009-2019, there was a nationwide rise in support of attitudes in accordance with the SDT. This trend is well apparent, despite a moderate decline in support of divorce as the best solution in insolvable relationships. In addition, it was found that the level of religiosity had a substantial and negative effect on the probability of supporting attitudes in accordance with the SDT. Furthermore, the type of residence (i.e., living in an urban environment) had no substantial effect on the probability of supporting these attitudes. Additionally, although differences in support of these attitudes were found between residents of Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv, they were less consistent and substantial after the effects of religious affiliation and religiosity were considered. However, residing in Tel-Aviv had substantial and positive effects on the probability of accepting unmarried couples' parenthood and on the probability of preferring establishing a family for women aged 30 and above. This study also points out that certain attitudes are more supported by Jews, while others are more supported by Muslims.

Keywords: Second Demographic Transition; Israel; Religiosity; Jews; Muslims; Urbanization

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Introduction

The Second Demographic Transition (SDT) is a theoretical framework that tries to explain changes in demographic behaviors that occurred in the West during the second half of the 20th century. These demographic behaviors are mainly related to fertility, union formations, and union dissolutions. Furthermore, these behaviors are resulted and unfold together with societal changes. Consequently, living arrangements in Western populations became more diversified; and the life-course of its members became more flexible (Lesthaeghe, 2014).

Some features of the SDT were also found in other parts of the world, such as in Latin America and East Asia (Lesthaeghe, 2010; Lesthaeghe, 2014). Some of the SDT characteristics were also discovered among certain groups in Israel's population (Bystrov, 2012). Despite this discovery, three SDT features were marginal in Israel's population. These features included extra-marital births, unmarried cohabitation, and ultimate childlessness (Bystrov, 2012). Although not all of these features are required in order to evaluate if a population is experiencing an SDT, like in the case of East Asian countries (Lesthaeghe, 2010), these features do however indicate an outcome of the SDT that characterizes contemporary European societies – i.e., a diversity of living arrangements (Lesthaeghe, 2010; Lesthaeghe, 2014). Based on empirical evidence that will be presented in the next section, it appears that, in recent years, features that indicate a diversity of living arrangements in Israel are still relatively rare, especially when compared to EU countries. In the past decade, however, trends in these features have been considerably increasing in Israel.

Israel's current situation, in relation to the SDT concept described above, encourages us to study more thoroughly opinions in the Israeli society that refer to demographic behaviors which are directly related to the SDT concept. According to the SDT theory, trends in demographic behaviors that occur during an SDT are interrelated with societal changes, and both are assumed to be influenced by an ideational change in society (Lesthaeghe, 2010; Lesthaeghe, 2014). Hence, this leads us to consider specific aspects of socio-cultural changes that are directly related to demographic outcomes of the SDT – i.e., **attitudes** about demographic behaviors that characterize an SDT. Such attitudes include, for instance, opinions about extra-marital childbearing and childrearing and perceptions about childlessness, divorce, and other related phenomena. Such attitudes can also be associated with the ideal timing of forming a family, opinions about the desirable number of children in a family, or other attitudes related to such family dynamics. Therefore, the present study first aims to provide an adequate

answer to the following questions: **In recent years, were there any changes in the support of attitudes in accordance with the SDT in Israel? Additionally, to what extent do subgroups in the Israeli population differ in their level of support of these attitudes?**

In a pioneering study that focused on Israel regarding aspects of the SDT theory, Evgenia Bystrov has found that in the Israeli society, religious affiliation and level of religiosity are associated with demographic behaviors and value orientation that are related to the SDT. Meaning secular Jews were found to be the vanguards of an SDT in Israel, while Muslims and ultra-Orthodox Jews did not fit this concept (Bystrov, 2012). In general, the importance of focusing on religious affiliation and religiosity in the research of Israel's population is well reflected in several studies that are part of this body of research (e.g., Friedlander & Feldmann, 1993; Hleihel, 2011; Bystrov, 2012; Okun, 2013; Okun, 2017). Therefore, the second group of questions in this current study is the following: **Does religious affiliation and religiosity influence attitudes in accordance with the SDT in Israel (while other effects are considered)? If so, what is the degree of impact of these influences?**

Furthermore, Israel's population is becoming more urban (ICBS, 2022a), yet there are stark differences between its two largest cities. Meaning striking differences exist between religious and national Jerusalem and secular and global Tel-Aviv (Alfasi & Fenster, 2005). Therefore, the current study will try to shed light on the impact of place of residence. Since religion and religiosity are central to how the SDT is unfolded in Israel (Bystrov, 2012), it is important to challenge their influence by thoroughly evaluating additional effects, such as place of residence. Hence, the third group of questions of this current study is the following: **Does place of residence (i.e., living in urban compared to suburban and rural environments, as well as living in Jerusalem compared to Tel-Aviv) influence attitudes in accordance with the SDT in Israel while other effects are also considered? If so, what is the magnitude of this influence compared to other effects?**

Demographic processes continue to exist after studies are published. Whether trends in demographic behaviors continue, become stagnant, or even reverse, when it comes to an ongoing demographic transition, a continuing follow-up is required. Moreover, such a follow-up on attitudes about these behaviors is also important. This is because these views might imply future directions in certain population processes by revealing something about their acceptance in a particular society. This acceptance is the ground on which behaviors grow, and it is easier for them to develop when perceived as more legitimate.

Background and Theory

The Concept of the SDT

The Second Demographic Transition (SDT) concept was introduced in 1986 and defined by Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk van de Kaa. This concept is an attempt to provide a theoretical explanation for changes in demographic behaviors that emerged in the West that were unexpected regarding the endpoint of the demographic transition (i.e., the First Demographic Transition – FDT). At the end of the FDT, the population was expected to be older and stationary, stable in size, with fertility close to replacement levels and a higher life expectancy above 70 years of age (Lesthaeghe, 2014).

Lesthaeghe described changes that occurred during the SDT in the West by contrasting it to the FDT. He argued that the FDT was a necessary precondition for the emergence of the SDT. He referred to three significant aspects of these changes: marriage, fertility, and societal changes (Lesthaeghe, 2014).

During the FDT, the age at first marriage decreased, while marriage rates increased, and cohabitation became rare. After the 1960s, during the SDT, these trends reversed, with an increase in the age of first marriage, a growing tendency to live alone or cohabiting before marriage, and a higher frequency of long-term cohabitation instead of marriage. Additionally, during the FDT, divorce rates were low, and cases of divorce or widowhood were usually followed by remarriage. However, during the SDT, post-marital relations were less channeled toward remarriage but rather were inclined towards cohabitation or “Living Apart Together” (LAT) relationships (Lesthaeghe, 2014).

Regarding fertility, during the FDT, marital fertility became more common while fertility declined. Additionally, the mean age of initial childbearing decreased, and childlessness remained low among married couples. The SDT emerged with multifaceted revolutions that began during the 1960s - the contraceptive revolution, the sexual revolution, and the sex revolution. These revolutions correspond to values such as rejecting authority, demanding freedom of choice for individuals, and changing the normative structure. This had implications on fertility, such as the increase in mean age at first childbearing, the loss of opportunity of childbearing due to higher divorce rates, and the rise in the proportion of childless women, while higher parity births (four or more children) became rare. Consequently, structural long-term below-replacement fertility has occurred (Lesthaeghe, 2014).

Changes in demographic behaviors during the SDT unfold together with societal changes such as the following: The shift from being preoccupied with basic material needs for survival to focusing more on “higher order” needs; the shift from belonging to political, civic, and community-oriented networks, to disengaging from them; the change from living under strong normative regulations to questioning authority; and the shift from a more ordered to a more flexible life-course, that includes diversity in lifestyles (Lesthaeghe, 2014).

Additionally, while formulating the SDT concept, Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa were inspired by Phillip Aries and Richard Easterlin and were critical of their theories. Economic circumstances crystallized the SDT concept, but the importance of the cultural context was also taken into consideration. Meaning ideational factors are considered to have a substantial role in the dynamics of the cultural shift. A primary intellectual source that contributed to the SDT concept was Abraham Maslow’s theory of changing needs from 1954. Maslow argued that when populations become wealthier and more educated, a shift occurs from focusing on survival, security, and solidarity to focusing more on values related to individual self-realization, recognition, grassroots democracy, expressive work, and education. Hence, the SDT theory is linked to Ron Inglehart’s concept of “post-materialism”. These changes in value orientation are also essential for the SDT theory for predicting demographic outcomes, such as sustained sub-replacement fertility and the rise of various living arrangements in non-western societies. The prediction of such outcomes is reasonable as long as these societies develop and implement Maslowian “higher order needs” of self-actualization while diversity is protected by democratic institutions (Lesthaeghe, 2014).

The SDT theory has been criticized for various reasons by a number of scholars (Coleman, 2004; Zaidi & Morgan, 2017). This present study, however, does not aim to refute or support a theory but to broaden our understanding of views that directly refer to demographic behaviors identified with the SDT. Israel’s population is an interesting case for studying such views, which will be further highlighted throughout this study.

Israel and the SDT

There are numerous ways to introduce Israel as an interesting case study of the SDT, from historical circumstances to socio-political dynamics and more. A possible way of doing it is by referring to Israel’s overall Total Fertility Rate (TFR). As a member of the OECD, Israel had an exceptionally higher TFR of 3.1 children per woman on average (2016) compared to all

OECD member countries (OECD, 2019). An initial thought might lead to a conclusion that the SDT is irrelevant to Israel's population due to its high overall TFR. However, a more analytical approach might start by thinking about Israel as being a member country of the OECD, and for being so, it is considered to have a developed economy; and by being economically developed, it can be assumed that some parts of its society might have experienced societal changes that are relevant to an SDT. Hence, this stream of thought leads us to continue suspecting the idea of the SDT as being experienced in Israel.

Israel's population is exceptionally heterogeneous based on religious affiliation, level of religiosity (which is more apparent among Jews), ethnic origin, and immigration (Bystrov, 2012; Okun, 2013). It has been previously highlighted that Israel's nationwide findings, in this regard, seem to obscure similar findings within its different sub-groups (Bystrov, 2012). Therefore, it is not surprising that religious affiliation and religiosity have been of central research interest in several studies that have focused on various demographic behaviors in Israel (Friedlander & Feldmann, 1993; Hleihel, 2011; Bystrov, 2012; Okun, 2013; Okun, 2017; Schellekens & Gliksberg, 2018).

Various recent demographic findings provide an initial sense of Israel's heterogeneous society. Israel had a population of approximately 9.453 million residents (2021) of them, 73.87% were Jewish, 18.08% were Muslim, 1.94% were Christian, and 1.57% were Druze (ICBS, 2022b).¹ Israel's heterogeneous society is also expressed by self-defined levels of religiosity (2019) among its adult population (ages 20 and above). Among Jews, 43.2% were secular or not religious, 22.1% were traditional or not that religious, 13.3% were traditional-religious, 11.2% were religious, and 10.1% were orthodox. Among Muslims, 9.7% were not religious, 29.0% were not religious that much, 57.1% were religious, and 4.3% were very religious (calculated from Israel's Social Survey 2019 data file). When it comes to religiosity within Israel's Jewish society, "traditional Jews" are defined as people who fulfill some commandments and customs but are less likely to fulfill them strictly as religious or ultra-orthodox Jews do. Yet traditional Jews are not defined as secular (Okun, 2017).

A more salient demographic expression of Israel's heterogeneous population is illustrated by period TFRs of Jewish and Muslim women in Israel and their levels of religiosity. Muslim women had an overall TFR (2005-2009) of 3.62 (on average). A careful observation

¹ Percentages were calculated from absolute numbers (ICBS, 2022b).

of their TFRs by religiosity does not show a clear pattern. The highest TFR was among religious Muslim women (3.83), while the lowest TFR was among very religious Muslim women (2.78), which was considerably lower than the TFR of Muslim women who are not that religious or not religious (3.47). In comparison, the overall TFR of Jewish women (2007-2009) was 2.91 (on average). An in-depth observation of TFRs of Jewish women by religiosity reveals considerable and consistent differences in fertility levels. Meaning orthodox Jewish women had an extremely high TFR (6.53), as well as religious Jewish women (4.26), while significantly lower TFRs were found among traditional-religious Jewish women (2.58), among Jewish women who are traditional or not that religious (2.26), and especially among secular or not religious Jewish women (2.07). These TFRs were calculated by applying the History Birth Method on aggregated samples of Israel's Social Survey regarding women who responded to the survey in 2002-2009, while data on their births during 1979-2009 was added from Israel's population register (Hleihel, 2011).

Until now, the most comprehensive study on how the SDT has unfolded in Israel was conducted by Bystrov (Bystrov, 2012). She was inspired by an earlier research revealing that Israeli non-religious Jews of European origin reached sub-replacement fertility levels during the mid-1980s (Friedlander & Feldmann, 1993). This motivated her to explore how the demographic transition has unfolded in Israel's population, in three areas (fertility, marriage, and value orientation), according to aspects of the SDT theory. This exploration was implemented by comprehensive observations based on various data sources (Bystrov, 2012).

Bystrov's primary approach in observing Israeli society is that it resembles a collection of different regions in the world rather than parts of the same society. Her main argument is that during the 1990s and 2000s, most of the Jewish population in Israel experienced transitions in marriage, in living arrangements, and in fertility that were accompanied by a change in emancipative values; and that this combination between demographic behaviors and ideational change is related to assumptions of the SDT theory. More specifically, demographic trends related to the SDT were experienced first and foremost among secular Israeli Jews (especially those of European origin). Furthermore, in some cases, their values and demographic behaviors resemble several characteristics of certain European countries. However, she claims that ultra-Orthodox Jews do not fit the SDT concept, while the Muslim community in Israel is at a pre-transitional level of the SDT (Bystrov, 2012).

This argument is based on various findings. The “marriage transition” in Israel includes, for instance, findings such as a considerable rise in the age of marriage since the 1970s among Jewish women, especially among those with lower levels of religiosity. In contrast, this rise was relatively moderate among Muslim women. The “fertility transition” in Israel is expressed by various findings that support this argument. It is expressed by the postponement of childbearing among Jewish women. It is also illustrated by differences in completed TFRs, which were the highest among Muslims and ultra-Orthodox Jews. Furthermore, among Jews, completed TFRs decreased appropriately with the decrease in their level of religiosity (Bystrov, 2012).

Other findings supporting Bystrov’s main argument are based on changes in attitudes and values. For instance, among Jews, religiosity mostly had a significant effect on the variation of emancipative values, which are associated with ideational change. She also presented findings indicating that Jews with lower levels of religiosity were more supportive towards attitudes about living arrangements that are alternative to marriage. However, raising a family was found to have the highest priority for the vast majority of Jews, regardless of their religiosity (Bystrov, 2012).

In contrast, Bystrov also argues that some features of SDT were marginal among all Israeli groups. These features included demographic behaviors such as widespread cohabitation, childbearing outside of marriage, and ultimate childlessness. For instance: Approximately 94% of Israelis aged 45-49 were married at least once. Additionally, ultimate childlessness among Jewish women aged 40 and above was low, even among secular women (7%). Extra-marital births were marginal (4%), despite a considerable rise in rates of non-marital childbearing among Jewish women at higher ages (Bystrov, 2012).

Bystrov also suggests possible causes that might impede a demographic transition in Israel. She mainly refers to state-religion relations, such as the authority of orthodox institutions of each religion to regulate personal matters of marriage and divorce. Civil marriage in Israel does not exist like in western countries. However, marriages and divorces performed abroad and “alternative marriages” performed in Israel are recognized and registered in Israel’s Population Register. She also suggests another reason that seems to impede a demographic transition in Israel: the traditionalism of its society, which is associated with marriage and childbearing. In her opinion, a demographic transition also seems to be hindered due to changes

in the composition of Israel's population resulting from higher fertility levels among more religious Jews (Bystrov, 2012).

Some reflections on Bystrov's study need to be made. For example, her results can be interpreted alternatively by viewing Israel as an unclear case of the SDT concept. Although certain groups in Israel's society do experience postponement of marriage and childbearing, it was also apparent that fertility was mostly above replacement levels, and in general, marriage was close to universal, while extra-marital births and ultimate childlessness were rare. Therefore, this leads to the readdressed question: Can it still be concluded that the SDT has occurred in Israel? On the one hand, the three latter results seem to be cardinal for a transition toward a diversification of living arrangements (Lesthaeghe, 2014); therefore, the answer to this question might be negative. The answer can also be in the affirmative if we endorse the criteria that Lesthaeghe applied in certain East Asian societies and subsequently concluded that they are experiencing such a transition (Lesthaeghe, 2010).² However, it seems that this set of criteria does not necessarily lead to a multidimensional diversification of living arrangements.

These opposite answers lead to a theoretical dilemma about Israel as an SDT case, but for now, we can assume that during past decades certain groups in Israel are experiencing an ongoing onset of an SDT that might or might not lead to a diversification of living arrangements.

Therefore, by assuming this ongoing onset, we can recognize the importance of conducting comprehensive research on specific attitudes that directly indicate an acceptance or a rejection of an SDT. Such views, for instance, can refer to the postponement of establishing families or opinions that express tolerance toward various familial living arrangements, etc. Although these kinds of attitudes are far from measuring the whole concept of ideational change, it seems that such attitudes are strongly associated with values of individual self-realization and recognition (of the lifestyles of others). And hence, they are more direct by their character in evaluating the support of an SDT. Consequently, studying such views can broaden our assessment of how supportive Israeli society is toward a transition that might change its familial structure. Although it has been studied before by Bystrov

² Lesthaeghe's characteristics: Sub-replacement fertility must be related to postponements of marriage and childbearing; ages at marriage must indicate free choice of partner and women's autonomy; premarital cohabitation is more accepted and frequent; demographic features and value orientation must be connected, both on the macro level and on the individual level (Lesthaeghe, 2010).

(Bystrov, 2012), more systematic observation is required. This extended study is also necessary since only the levels of significance of the effects of religiosity on such attitudes were mentioned in her research (Bystrov, 2012).

Furthermore, Bystrov's analyses did not include aspects regarding the place of residence (Bystrov, 2012). The impact of place of residence is not new in the study of Israel's population. For instance, Friedlander and Feldmann have shown that during the mid-1980s, living in metropolitan areas had a negative effect on the fertility levels of Jews of European origin, but this effect was marginal when compared with the effect of religiosity (Friedlander & Feldmann, 1993). Despite these results, it is worth reexamining the impact of place of residence because of a substantial urbanization process experienced in Israel during the past few decades (ICBS, 2022a).³ In a literature review provided by Walford and Kurek, the authors suggested that nationwide onsets of SDT characteristics usually occurred in urban areas of countries and tended to extend to suburban and rural areas subsequently. Such regional differences were evident in several countries, although in some cases, regional differences seem to be unclear. In their study, Walford and Kurek discovered that in countries located in different regions of Europe (e.g., in England and Wales and more recently in Poland), various SDT features initially emerged in urban and metropolitan areas and then subsequently spread to rural areas (Walford & Kurek, 2016). Since several SDT features are experienced by certain groups in Israel (Bystrov, 2012), it will be interesting to see if the type of residence also plays a role in support of SDT attitudes.

However, the association between urbanization and the SDT can be challenged. By conducting comparative research in three Western European countries, Lesthaeghe and Neels have discovered that although urbanization was found to be a predictor of an SDT in Switzerland, such an association was found to be weaker in France and absent in Belgium. Nevertheless, the authors discovered that the regions that were the vanguards in manifesting features of an FDT in all three countries were the same regions that first revealed characteristics of an SDT. Moreover, spatial differences regarding the FDT that emerged during the 18th and 19th centuries resulted from an early secularization in all three countries. These patterns of the SDT are embedded within this secularization which preserved its spatial characteristics at least

³ During 1995-2020, the number of residents in cities with 200,000 or more in Israel has increased substantially from approximately 1.211 million to 3.073 million persons (from 21.6% to 33.1% among the total population) (calculated from ICBS, 2022a).

until the 1960s (Lesthaeghe & Neels, 2002). In the Israeli context, these results are interesting and suggest the need for further research - not only because Belgium's findings are challenging the association between the SDT and urban residency but also because secularization seems to play an essential role in the process of the SDT. Since religiosity was also found to be central to Israel's SDT experience (Bystrov, 2012), there might be doubts about the impact of residency in urban areas on SDT attitudes in Israel.

Living in urban or rural areas is one of many aspects of place of residence. A distinction of certain areas can also examine this concept. For instance, Israel's two largest cities, Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv, manifest fundamental differences (Alfasi & Fenster, 2005). Hence, their differences can be further studied through the lens of the SDT.

The main argument of Alfasi and Fenster is that Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv differ in city-state relations, which consequently formulate two types of citizenships embodied in each city. Meaning Jerusalem is characterized by a national and religious citizenship, while Tel-Aviv displays a citizenship that is inclusive, urban, and more globally oriented (Alfasi & Fenster, 2005). However, thoughts about the association between the SDT and these cities are mainly derived from various findings provided by the authors about the striking differences between Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv. Some of these findings are presented in the next paragraph.

Jerusalem, a holy city for three monotheistic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), has almost constantly been subjected to geopolitical struggles throughout history and since the 20th century, with struggles mainly related to the Jewish-Palestinian conflict. Jerusalem is also the capital of Israel, and disputes over the city are well associated with religious faiths and symbolism. On the other hand, Tel-Aviv was established in 1909 on the coastline near Jaffa as a secular city. Since its establishment, Tel-Aviv's local leaders have embraced a self-managerial approach over municipal and economic issues, which has been independent of the central government, both during the British mandate and since Israel's independence in 1948. Tel-Aviv serves as Israel's cultural and economic center and is characterized by its free, open, and modern atmosphere. Differences between the two cities are also related to social and demographic features. While most residents of Jerusalem are Jewish, its population includes considerably large minorities of ultra-Orthodox Jews as well as Arabs; and the proportional size of each group is approximately one-third of Jerusalem's population. Both minorities tend to have large families, and both are also socially and geographically segregated, and as a result, their traditional lifestyles are preserved. In contrast, most residents

of Tel-Aviv are secular, with a relatively small minority of Arabs that resides in Jaffa. Most of its secular residents live in small households, especially in the city center. Tel-Aviv is becoming a global city. It has an urban metropolitan core, which is business-oriented, and the two most dominant employment sectors in Tel-Aviv are business and finance services. Tel-Aviv is also the national center for banking, finance, and accountancy. In contrast, Jerusalem is primarily a poor city, and its urban economy is more local and isolated. Since Jerusalem is the capital, a significant part of the public sector is located in the city, including various governmental ministries. Additional financial differences between the two cities are apparent (1999). Compared to Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv had a higher municipal budget, a substantially higher investment per capita (based on the regular budget), a considerably higher self-income, and a significantly lower deficit to return to the government (Alfasi & Fenster, 2005). Therefore, it is reasonable to presume that Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv residents also differ in how supportive they are towards SDT attitudes.

Recent Findings

Changes in demographic behaviors that characterize an SDT are assumingly associated with ideational change (Lesthaeghe, 2014). Therefore, it is essential to present an overview of such behaviors in Israel during recent years.

It seems that Israel differs substantially from EU countries in most SDT features. Compared to all EU countries, Israel had the highest period TFR (3.01 in 2019) (Figure 1) (World Bank, 2022), the highest average number of people per household (3.32 in 2015) (Figure 2) (OECD, 2022), and had the lowest proportion of single-person households (17.7% in 2011) (Figure 3) (ICBS, 2021a; OECD, 2022). Additionally, the average age of women at first birth in Israel (27.7 in 2019) was lower than most EU countries (Figure 4) (ICBS, 2020; OECD, 2022), while Israel's proportion of births outside of marriage was significantly smaller compared to all EU countries (7.5% in 2017) (Figure 5) (OECD, 2022). Furthermore, compared to selected EU countries, Israel's proportion of childless women (among women at ages 40-44) was relatively low (10.8% in 2008) (Figure 6) (OECD, 2022). Israel also differs from selected EU countries by marital status (among ages 45-49 in 2014) by having one of the highest proportions of married persons for both among men (78.8%) and among women (72.4%) (Figure 7), and by having one of the lowest proportions of single persons (i.e., never married) with 9.5% among men and 9.4% among women (Figure 8) (UN, 2019).

Regarding the above findings, Israel is far from completing an SDT. However, the following trends shed light on Israel's substantial progress in this process. During 2016-2020 Israel's period TFR decreased from 3.11 to 2.90 (Figure 9) (ICBS, 2021b; World Bank, 2022).⁴ Furthermore, during 2010-2020 Israel's proportion of single-person households increased from 17.9% to 19.9% (Figure 10) (ICBS, 2021a), while its average age of women at first childbearing rose from 27.2 (2010) to 27.7 (2020) (ICBS, 2011a; ICBS, 2021c). Moreover, during 2010-2017 Israel's proportion of births outside of marriage increased from 5.8% to 7.5% (Figure 11) (OECD, 2022). Additionally, during 2000-2014 proportions of divorced and single persons (among ages 45-49) also increased significantly. Percentages of divorced were rising both among women (from 12.2% to 16.2%) and among men (from 7.1% to 11.4%), and so did the percentages of singles among women (from 6.0% to 9.4%) and especially among men (from 4.6% to 9.5%) (Figure 12) (UN, 2019).

The **onsets** of SDT demographic trends in Israel mostly emerged during the second half of the 20th century. For instance, in the area of fertility, it is expressed by decreases in period TFRs since the 1960s (ICBS, 2021b) and the postponement of childbearing among Jewish women during the 1990s and 2000s (Bystrov, 2012). For instance, in the area of family unions and dissolutions, it is expressed by increasing divorce rates since the early 1970s (ICBS, 2021d) and the decline of marriage among Jews since the 1960s, first as a period effect, which turned to a decline of marriage as a result of cohort effect (since 1990-1994) (Schellekens & Gliksberg, 2018). And yet, although such trends began earlier, their magnitude in recent years encourages our interest more than ever to further study attitudes directly linked to these dynamics.

Findings about Place of Residence

Findings imply that Israel's urban population in 2020 was highly heterogeneous. Among Israel's most populated cities (of 200,000 residents and above), the range of the period TFRs was substantially wide (from 1.8 to 5.8) (ICBS, 2022e), and so was the range of the proportion of single households (from 9.0% to 38.4%) (ICBS, 2022f). Therefore, it seems that

⁴ In 2020, Muslim and Jewish women had approximately equal levels of TFR (3.0). However, the latter began experiencing a moderate decrease only recently, while the TFR of Muslim women has dropped sharply from 4.6 (during 2000-2004) to 3.0 (2020) (ICBS, 2021b). This sharp trend raises doubts about the current association between the SDT and religious affiliation in Israel.

living in urban areas is less associated with the SDT due to the heterogeneous results of SDT features.

However, the differences between Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv are salient. Jerusalem had a high period TFR (3.8), while Tel-Aviv's period TFR has already reached below replacement levels (1.8) (ICBS, 2021e). Furthermore, the proportion of single households in Jerusalem (18.6%) was lower than in Tel-Aviv (38.4%) (ICBS, 2021f). Moreover, in 2019, the proportions of single persons among Jews in ages 45-49 were higher in Tel-Aviv than in Jerusalem, both among men (32.4% compared to 13.1%) and women (29.0% compared to 11.5%) (Nahir, 2022). Therefore, it can be assumed that Tel-Aviv is more associated with the SDT than Jerusalem.

The Hypotheses

The present study includes four hypotheses.

The first hypothesis is based on the following thinking: Since it is assumed that Israel's recent trends of demographic behaviors indicate a considerable progress towards experiencing an SDT and since demographic behaviors related to the SDT are assumed to result from an ideational change (Lesthaeghe, 2014), while attitudes in accordance with the SDT are thought to be a part of the concept of ideational change, then **hypothesis 1** is as follows: **In recent years, there has been an overall rise, among the adult population of Israel, in the support of attitudes in accordance with the SDT.**

Additionally, since it was previously discovered that secularization is linked to the SDT in different countries (Lesthaeghe & Neels, 2002), and since the level of religiosity of the Jewish majority in Israel is not only associated with the SDT, but also had an impact on emancipative values (which are strongly related to ideational change) (Bystrov, 2012), then, **hypothesis 2** is as follows: **Among the adult population of Israel, the level of religiosity has a negative influence on the level of support of attitudes in accordance with the SDT, and the influence of religiosity is substantial in its magnitude, even when other influences are taken in consideration.**

Although it has been shown that religious affiliation in Israel is associated with the SDT (Bystrov, 2012), the period TFR of Muslim women has declined sharply during the past two decades (ICBS, 2021b). While this trend suggests that the Muslim population is experiencing a transitional change, it is unclear if Muslims and Jews currently differ from one another in

relation to the SDT by their views. Therefore, this study does not include a hypothesis about the association between religious affiliation and attitudes in accordance with the SDT. In spite of this, and since religious affiliation is cardinal in the study of Israel's population, differences by religion will be discussed in the results section of the current study.

Regarding place of residence, in most cases, the SDT has primarily emerged in urban areas of various countries (Walford & Kurek, 2016). In some countries, however, such as Belgium, this pattern was not evident (Lesthaeghe & Neels, 2002). In Israel's context, the association between urbanity and the SDT seems to be doubtful due to the high variation among the largest cities of Israel when it comes to findings that indicate an SDT (ICBS, 2021e; ICBS, 2021f). Hence, **Hypothesis 3** is as follows: **Among the adult population of Israel, type of residence (i.e., residing in urban, or suburban and rural areas) does not have an influence on the level of support of attitudes in accordance with the SDT, and the influence of the type of residence is also insignificant in its magnitude, when other effects such as religiosity and religious affiliation, are taken into consideration.**

It can be assumed, however, that the SDT is associated with place of residence based on a distinction between Israel's two largest cities. Since stark differences have previously been found between religious and national Jerusalem on the one hand and secular and global Tel-Aviv on the other hand (Alfasi & Fenster, 2005), and since differences between these two cities were also clearly described with updated SDT indicators (ICBS, 2021e; ICBS, 2021f; Nahir, 2022) which imply that Tel-Aviv is probably experiencing an SDT, then **Hypothesis 4** is as follows: **Among the adult population of Israel, city of residence (i.e., residing in Tel-Aviv or in Jerusalem) has an influence on the level of support of attitudes in accordance with the SDT. In other words, people who reside in Tel-Aviv tend to be more supportive of such views than people who reside in Jerusalem, and such differences in residencies influence the variance of these views and are substantial in their magnitude, even when other influences, such as religiosity and religious affiliation, are taken into consideration.**

Data and Methods

Data Source

Israel's Social Survey (ISS) is conducted annually by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) since 2002. Each annual survey sample represent Israel's adult population aged 20 and above. The analyses of this cross-sectional study are based on data obtained from rounds 2009 and 2019 of the ISS, which included 7,462 and 7,575 respondents, respectively.

Choosing the ISS as the data source for the analyses is based on three main reasons. First, each round includes a large sample of about 7,500 respondents. This enables us to thoroughly test the results of relatively small subgroups, such as Tel-Aviv residents or very religious people. Second, the 2009 and 2019 rounds include identical items that can measure major aspects of the SDT and their trends. And third, it covers a large segment of recent years, enabling us to test hypothesis 1, and also refers to updated data for testing hypotheses 2-4.

ISS files were requested by completing an electronic form in Hebrew via ICBS's website and received on March 2022. ISS files included questionnaires and codebooks in Hebrew (with variable labels in Latin letters) and data files in CSV and SAS formats. Subsequently, the author imported the CSV files as STATA files. Although files of the questionnaires and codebooks were received in Hebrew, it is worth mentioning that ISS interviews are conducted in three languages: Hebrew, Arabic, and Russian.

Dealing with questionnaires and codebooks in Hebrew was challenging. It was decided that relevant items and values in these files will be processed as close to a word-by-word translation as possible from Hebrew to English. However, this process was not implemented by translation software but by the author himself.

An additional challenge emerged when the questionnaires were compared with the codebooks. Based on the codebooks, in some cases, values were grouped, and new variables were calculated. Despite this challenge, it was still possible to conduct statistical analyses that adequately test the research hypotheses.

Dependent Variables

Attitudes in accordance with the SDT are the dependent variables. They are based on seven ISS items worded identically in both the 2009 and 2019 rounds. These items cover views

on some of the main demographic behaviors that characterize an SDT. Items of **attitudes 1-3** are measured by values of years. Items of **attitudes 4-7** are measured by values on a four-point scale: strongly agree; agree; do not agree that much; do not agree at all. All items included the answers “don’t know” and “irrelevant”. All items were transformed into attitudes measured as ordinal and dichotomous variables, each consisting of two values: more supportive (value 1); less supportive (value 0). The attitudes are as follows:

- **Attitude 1: Preference of establishing a family for men aged 30 and above.**

This attitude is measured according to the question, “In your opinion, what is the desirable age for a man to establish a family?”. Answers in round 2009 included age-groups (19 and below; 20-24; 25-29; 30-34; 35-39; 40 and above) and the answer “It is not desirable to establish a family”.⁵ In round 2019 however, respondents could answer in single years, but in its codebook, the lowest and highest answers were grouped (19 and below; 31-34; 35 and above).

It was decided that those who answered age 30 or above are considered more supportive of an SDT than those who answered age 29 or below.

- **Attitude 2: Preference of establishing a family for women aged 30 and above.**

This attitude is measured according to the question, “In your opinion, what is the desirable age for a woman to establish a family?”. In both rounds, the values for these questions were similar to the analogous questions that referred to men.⁶ Similarly to attitude 1, in attitude 2, those who answered age 30 or above are considered more supportive of an SDT than those who answered age 29 or below.

- **Attitude 3: Preference of a family with two children or less.**

This attitude is measured according to the question, “In your opinion, what is the desired number of children in a family?”. In both rounds, this was an open question. In both codebooks, the highest answers were grouped (7-9; 10-12; 13-21).

Respondents who answered two children or less are considered more supportive of an SDT. Such answers correspond with preferring fertility below replacement levels. Respondents who answered three children or above are regarded as less supportive towards an SDT.

⁵ Due to its minute frequency (11 respondents), the results of both rounds could still be compared reasonably.

⁶ Due to a minute frequency (six respondents) in round 2009 to the answer “It is not desirable to establish a family”, the results of both rounds could still be compared reasonably.

- **Attitude 4: Perception of divorce as the best solution in insolvable relationships.**

This attitude is measured according to the item, “Do you agree with the sentence: Divorce is the best solution for couples that cannot manage to cope with the problems in the relations between them”.

Respondents who answered “strongly agree” or “agree” are considered more supportive of an SDT than those who answered “do not agree that much” or “do not agree at all”.

- **Attitude 5: Acceptance of unmarried couples’ parenthood.**

This attitude is measured according to the item, “Do you agree with the sentence: Couples who want children must be married”.

Respondents who answered “do not agree at all” or “do not agree that much” are considered more supportive of an SDT than those who answered “strongly agree” or “agree”.

- **Attitude 6: Perception of single-parenthood as good as couple-parenthood.**

This attitude is measured according to the item, “Do you agree with the sentence: A single parent is capable of raising his/her own children as well as parental couples”.

Respondents who answered “strongly agree” or “agree” are considered more supportive of an SDT than those who answered “do not agree that much” or “do not agree at all”.

Single-parenthood results from various circumstances, such as a decision made by individuals or as a constraint. Single-parenthood is another expression of familial diversification in a society. Therefore, it is related to the SDT.

- **Attitude 7: Perception of childrearing at the expense of self-actualization.**

This attitude is measured according to the item, “Do you agree with the sentence: People who raise children give up on a lot in life”.

Respondents who answered “strongly agree” or “agree” are considered more supportive of an SDT than those who answered “do not agree that much” or “do not agree at all”.

Conceptually, this item challenges our thought. Having children seems to have implications on self-actualization in both the FDT and the SDT by various circumstances. On the contrary, it can also be understood from the SDT theory that childrearing is not necessarily countered by self-actualization (Lesthaeghe, 2014). Therefore, this attitude is assumingly related to the support of the FDT and the

beginning of the SDT. Hence, it is located between these transitions and is consequently understood as a precursor of the SDT.

Last, although these seven attitudes do not cover all SDT features (e.g., LAT relationships; premarital cohabitation; childlessness; remarriage), they still cover significant aspects of this concept (such as postponement of childbearing, lower levels of fertility, divorce, extra-marital births, unmarried cohabitation and more). The results of these seven attitudes can provide sufficient information regarding the Israeli public opinion about behaviors typical to the SDT.

Independent Variables

A more detailed version of this sub-section appears in the appendix (Text 1).⁷

Independent variables are clustered into four groups: demographic variables, Socio-Economic Status (SES) variables; geographical variables; faith variables.

The statistical analyses are implemented by methods of descriptive statistics as well as Linear Probability Models (LPMs).⁸ These methods will be further discussed. For now, it is worth mentioning that some independent variables are measured differently according to these methods.

Additionally, before referring specifically to each independent variable, it is essential to mention that all of them are based on items that included the values “don’t know” and “irrelevant”. The independent variables are as follows:

- Demographic variables

These variables include sex, marital status, age, number of children, and place of birth.

⁷ “Text 1” in the appendix (Page 64) is similar in its structure to the “Independent Variables” sub-section. However, “Text 1” provides thorough information about the items (as well as their values) that appear in the questionnaires and codebook (meaning, such items, and values that are cardinal in the construction of the independent variables). “Text 1” also includes all descriptions of the data transformations from items to independent variables.

⁸ These LPMs provide information about the probability of being more supportive or less supportive of attitudes in accordance with the SDT, based on being affiliated with certain values of independent variables (if the coefficients of these values are found to be significant).

Sex – This categorical nominal variable includes two values: men and women. The reference category in the LPMs refers to women.

Marital status – This is a categorical nominal variable. In descriptive statistics, it includes four values: married; divorced; widowed; single. The LPMs include three dichotomous variables of marital status in which the reference category refers to married people.

Age - This is a numeric ordinal variable. For descriptive statistics, age includes five age-groups: 20-29; 30-39; 40-49; 50-59; 60 and above. For the LPMs, however, age was treated as a parametric variable by transforming it, calculating its mean age (46.39241), and creating two variables that appear in the LPMs: the deviation from the mean age; and the squared deviation from the mean age.

Number of children – For the descriptive statistics, this numeric ordinal variable includes six values - from no children to 5 children and above. In the LPMs, this variable consists of eight values - from no children (value 0) to 7 children and above (value 7).

Place of birth - This categorical nominal variable includes two values: born in Israel; not born in Israel. In the LPMs, the reference category refers to the latter.

Born in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) - This categorical nominal variable is a calculated variable that refers to the Jewish population. It is analyzed by descriptive statistics merely and not by LPMs. Two values are included in this variable: Jews who were born in the FSU; Jews who were not born in the FSU.

- SES variables

These variables include the level of education, employment status, and household expenditures coverage.

Level of education - This ordinal variable refers to the highest educational diploma attained. It includes two values: academic education; non-academic education. Non-academic education is the reference category in the LPMs.

Employment status – For descriptive statistics, this categorical nominal variable includes three values: employed; unemployed; does not belong to the labor force. In the LPMs, employment status is a dichotomous variable with two values: employed; unemployed or does not belong to the labor force. The latter is the reference category.

Household expenditures coverage – For both methods, this numeric ordinal variable includes four values: not managing at all (value 0); not managing that much (value 1); managing (value 2); managing without any difficulty (value 3).

Household expenditures coverage is analyzed only in reference to round 2019. Its data from round 2009 was not analyzed due to a relatively high proportion of unknown answers.

Household expenditures coverage is analyzed in this study instead of the income level. This is because of the high proportions of unknown answers regarding income level in both rounds.

- Geographical variables

There are two geographical variables: type of residence and area of residence.

Type of residence – This categorial nominal variable is calculated and includes two values: urban;⁹ suburban and rural.¹⁰ In the LPMs, the reference category consists of the latter.

Area of residence - This categorial nominal variable includes three values: Jerusalem; Tel-Aviv; other areas in Israel. These values refer to people who live in the city of Jerusalem, in the city of Tel-Aviv, or in other areas of Israel, respectively. The LPMs include two dichotomous variables of the area of residence in which the reference category refers to people living in other areas in Israel.

- Faith variables

There are two faith variables: religious affiliation and level of religiosity.

Religious affiliation – In the descriptive statistics, this categorial nominal variable includes five values: Jewish; Muslim; Christian; Druze; Atheist. The LPMs include two dichotomous variables of religious affiliation (Jewish; Muslim) in which the reference category (other religious affiliations) refers to all the respondents who do not affiliate themselves as Jewish or Muslim (i.e., Christian, Druze, other religion or Atheist).

Level of religiosity - This ordinal variable is based on current self-definition. In descriptive statistics, it is analyzed twice - for Jews and for Muslims. For Jews, it includes five values: not religious, secular; traditional, not that religious; traditional-religious; religious; orthodox. For Muslims, it consists of four values: not religious; not

⁹ Consists of those residing in all cities with 200,000 residents and above, together with those who live in Tel-Aviv District in localities with less than 200,000 residents.

¹⁰ Consists of those residing in all localities with less than 200,000 residents, not including such localities in Tel-Aviv District.

religious that much; religious; very religious. In the LPMs, however, religiosity is calculated and refers to all people. It includes four values: secular;¹¹ not religious that much;¹² religious;¹³ orthodox, or very religious.¹⁴ Religiosity in the LPMs is analyzed by three dichotomous variables, in which the reference category refers to secular people.

Methods

The hypotheses are tested using descriptive statistics and LPMs.

Results of the descriptive statistics appear in Table 2 and refer to both points in time (2009 and 2019). Descriptive statistics analysis focuses on all seven attitudes. For each attitude, the findings refer to the proportions of the more supportive views regarding an SDT. These proportions are calculated among known cases (more and less supportive views, not including unknown answers). These proportions are analyzed for Israel's overall adult population as well as for its sub-groups. Hence, their results are sufficient for testing Hypothesis 1 and provide adequate answers to the first group of research questions.

Results of the LPMs appear in Tables 3-7, and they test hypotheses 2-4. All LPMs refer to influences on the probability of being more supportive of SDT attitudes.¹⁵ The LPMs refer to data from the year 2019 and focus on five attitudes (attitudes 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7).¹⁶

¹¹ Including: all Atheists; "not religious, secular" among Jews; and "not religious" among Muslims, Christians, Druze, and followers of other religions.

¹² Including: "traditional not that religious" among Jews; and "not religious that much" among Muslims, Christians, Druze, or followers of other religions.

¹³ Including: "traditional-religious" or "religious" among Jews; and "religious" among Muslims, Christians, Druze, and followers of other religions.

¹⁴ Including: "orthodox" among Jews; and "very religious" among Muslims, Christians, Druze, and followers of other religions.

¹⁵ These probabilities are calculated among known cases.

¹⁶ Attitudes 1 and 6 are not analyzed by LPMs. First, a very high and positive R-Pearson correlation ($r=0.54$) was found between Attitudes 1 and 2 (in round 2019). This is reasonable since both attitudes focus on the age of establishing a family for men and for women (respectively). Due to this positive and high correlation and since both attitudes focus on the same issue, it was decided to analyze only one of them by LPMs. Attitude 2 was chosen for such analysis since it could be understood that women's rights and autonomy are

Each attitude includes five models that examine the influences on the probability of its support:

- Model 1 tests the effects of demographic variables merely.
- Model 2 tests the effects of demographic and SES variables. It also tests the contribution of SES variables to Model 1.
- Model 3 tests the effects of demographic SES and geographical variables. It also tests the contribution of geographical variables to Model 2. Meaning it provides an initial assessment of the effects of the place of residence on the probability of supporting SDT attitudes without considering such influences of religious affiliation and religiosity.
- Model 4 tests the effects of all independent variables. Meaning all variables are controlled. It also tests the contribution of faith variables to Model 3. Moreover, this model evaluates the influences of the place of residence while the effects of religious affiliation and religiosity are controlled.
- Model 5 tests the effects of demographic and faith variables. This model assists us in evaluating the contribution of faith variables compared to Model 1. Model 5 doesn't include SES variables or geographical variables. Therefore, by comparing it to Model 4, we can also assess the contribution of SES and geographical variables when only demographic and faith variables are evaluated.

Ethical Considerations

The ISS was chosen as the data source of this study mainly because of its large survey samples. Large samples are more likely to protect respondents from being personally identified. This is illustrated by the first two columns of table 1, which refer to absolute numbers (in thousands) of various sub-groups. Furthermore, to ensure that each sub-group has an adequate number of respondents that cannot be identified, the author performed and checked distributions of each sub-group without weights. The results indicate that the respondents' privacy is protected throughout the descriptive statistics analysis since each sub-group included

central to the SDT theory (Lesthaeghe 2010; Lesthaeghe 2014). Second, Attitude 6 focuses on a certain living arrangement which is an alternative to marriage (single-parenthood). However, it seems that single-parenthood is less discussed in the SDT theory compared to other living arrangements which are alternative to marriage, such as divorce and unmarried cohabitation (Lesthaeghe 2010; Lesthaeghe 2014), which are measured in Attitudes 4 and 5 (respectively). Therefore, Attitude 6 was not analyzed by LPMs.

at least 48 respondents. Additionally, all LPMs include thousands of respondents, so identifying respondents by these models is highly challenging. In sum, the privacy of the respondents is protected in this current study.

This study highly focuses on differences between people by their socio-demographic backgrounds and self-definitions. Therefore, before analyzing the results of this study, it is important to clarify several issues. First and foremost, any interpretation attributing an essence to a specific social identity is a false misinterpretation. Differences can characterize groups at specific points in time, but they do not say anything about their essence. The author's basic approach is that all populations and groups in societies are potentially dynamic. Even if certain groups do not demonstrate any trends at specific points in time, it does not mean they will not experience changes in the future. This approach was constantly kept in mind while analyzing the results of this study.

Table 1: The Number of Respondents (n) of Israel's Social Survey, and their Weighted Total Population Numbers (N), by Various Characteristics - 2009 and 2019 (1)

	<i>The Number of Respondents of Israel's Social Survey (n) – Absolute numbers</i>		<i>Weighted Total Population Numbers of Israel's Social Survey (N) – Absolute numbers</i>	
	<i>2009</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2019</i>
Total	7,462	7,575	4,655,603	5,698,880
Type of residence				
Urban	2,877	3,292	1,792,080	2,544,553
Suburban and rural	4,584	4,283	2,862,939	3,154,326
Unknown cases	1	0		
Area of Residence				
Jerusalem	687	684	425,718	529,910
Tel-Aviv	434	434	301,311	348,844
Other areas in Israel	6,340	6,457	3,927,990	4,820,126
Unknown cases	1	0		
Religious Affiliation				
Jewish	6,056	5,871	3,739,697	4,416,834
Muslim	924	1,123	609,913	866,395
Christian	222	225	141,228	161,519
Druze	81	153	51,953	104,645
Atheist	169	179	107,486	132,475
Other religion	8	14	4,391	9,950
Unknown cases	2	10		
Level of Religiosity (Jews)				
Not religious, secular	2,546	2,551	1,547,049	1,904,133
Traditional not that religious	1,510	1,286	940,978	975,893
Traditional-religious	772	761	497,755	586,927
Religious	716	657	438,308	495,709
Orthodox	494	602	305,937	444,591
Unknown cases	18	14		
Level of Religiosity (Muslims)				
Not religious	99	108	63,545	83,779
Not religious that much	263	321	177,454	250,536
Religious	471	643	311,046	492,967
Very religious	90	48	57,262	36,783
Unknown cases	1	3		
Place of Birth				
Born in Israel	4,742	5,430	2,992,862	4,147,180
Not born in Israel	2,720	2,145	1,662,740	1,551,699
Born in FSU (Jews)				
Jews who were born in the FSU	1,030	880	639,638	630,568
Jews who were not born in the FSU	5,026	4,991	3,100,060	3,786,266

Table 1 (Cont.): The Number of Respondents (n) of Israel's Social Survey, and their Weighted Total Population Numbers (N), by Various Characteristics - 2009 and 2019 (1)

	<i>The Number of Respondents of Israel's Social Survey (n) – Absolute numbers</i>		<i>Weighted Total Population Numbers of Israel's Social Survey (N) – Absolute numbers</i>	
	<i>2009</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2019</i>
Total	7,462	7,575	4,655,603	5,698,880
Sex				
Men	3,612	3,751	2,257,234	2,775,813
Women	3,850	3,824	2,398,368	2,923,066
Age				
20-29	1,669	1,607	1,092,582	1,254,567
30-39	1,630	1,535	1,028,431	1,141,455
40-49	1,313	1,391	807,648	1,045,345
50-59	1,150	1,049	721,968	844,094
60 and above	1,700	1,993	1,004,974	1,413,418
Marital Status				
Married (2)	4,814	4,978	3,063,197	3,686,583
Divorced	508	559	278,541	447,220
Widowed	480	390	261,703	281,836
Single	1,656	1,648	1,050,224	1,283,240
Unknown cases	4	0		
Number of Children				
No children	1,965	1,922	1,229,090	1,487,463
One child	847	795	517,090	560,732
Two children	1,616	1,519	1,010,692	1,145,176
Three children	1,413	1,642	878,224	1,206,766
Four children	711	804	441,543	594,951
Five children and above	905	887	576,531	699,324
Unknown cases	5	6		
Level of Education				
Academic education	1,965	2,494	1,167,047	1,863,938
Non-academic education	5,351	5,067	3,396,428	3,824,308
Unknown cases	146	14		
Employment Status				
Employed	4,576	5,216	2,771,472	3,789,307
Unemployed	374	277	222,249	142,435
Does not belong to the labor force	2,512	2,082	1,661,881	1,767,137
Household Expenditures Coverage				
Not managing at all	NA	458	NA	352,620
Not managing that much	NA	1,771	NA	1,348,543
Managing	NA	3,814	NA	2,867,911
Managing without any difficulty	NA	1,447	NA	1,066,021
Unknown cases	NA	85	NA	

Table 1 (Cont.): The Number of Respondents (n) of Israel's Social Survey, and their Weighted Total Population Numbers (N), by Various Characteristics - 2009 and 2019 (1)

	<i>Respondents of Israel's Social Survey (n) – Distribution in Percentages</i>		<i>Weighted Total Population in Israel's Social Survey (N) - Distribution in Percentages</i>	
	<i>2009</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2019</i>
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Type of residence				
Urban	38.6%	43.5%	38.5%	44.7%
Suburban and rural	61.4%	56.5%	61.5%	55.3%
Unknown cases	0.01%			
Area of Residence				
Jerusalem	9.2%	9.0%	9.1%	9.3%
Tel-Aviv	5.8%	5.7%	6.5%	6.1%
Other areas in Israel	85.0%	85.2%	84.4%	84.6%
Unknown cases	0.01%			
Religious Affiliation				
Jewish	81.2%	77.5%	80.3%	77.6%
Muslim	12.4%	14.8%	13.1%	15.2%
Christian	3.0%	3.0%	3.0%	2.8%
Druze	1.1%	2.0%	1.1%	1.8%
Atheist	2.3%	2.4%	2.3%	2.3%
Other religion	0.1%	0.2%	0.1%	0.2%
Unknown cases	0.03%	0.1%		
Level of Religiosity (Jews) (3)				
Not religious, secular	42.0%	43.5%	41.5%	43.2%
Traditional not that religious	24.9%	21.9%	25.2%	22.1%
Traditional-religious	12.8%	13.0%	13.3%	13.3%
Religious	11.8%	11.2%	11.8%	11.2%
Orthodox	8.2%	10.3%	8.2%	10.1%
Unknown cases	0.3%	0.2%		
Level of Religiosity (Muslims) (4)				
Not religious	10.7%	9.6%	10.4%	9.7%
Not religious that much	28.5%	28.6%	29.1%	29.0%
Religious	51.0%	57.3%	51.0%	57.1%
Very religious	9.7%	4.3%	9.4%	4.3%
Unknown cases	0.1%	0.3%		
Place of Birth				
Born in Israel	63.6%	71.7%	64.3%	72.8%
Not born in Israel	36.5%	28.3%	35.7%	27.2%
Born in FSU (Jews) (3)				
Jews who were born in the FSU	17.0%	15.0%	17.1%	14.3%
Jews who were not born in the FSU	83.0%	85.0%	82.9%	85.7%

Table 1 (Cont.): The Number of Respondents (n) of Israel's Social Survey, and their Weighted Total Population Numbers (N), by Various Characteristics - 2009 and 2019 (1)

	<i>Respondents of Israel's Social Survey (n) – Distribution in Percentages</i>		<i>Weighted Total Population in Israel's Social Survey (N) - Distribution in Percentages</i>	
	<i>2009</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2019</i>
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Sex				
Men	48.4%	49.5%	48.5%	48.7%
Women	51.6%	50.5%	51.5%	51.3%
Age				
20-29	22.4%	21.2%	23.5%	22.0%
30-39	21.8%	20.3%	22.1%	20.0%
40-49	17.6%	18.4%	17.3%	18.3%
50-59	15.4%	13.9%	15.5%	14.8%
60 and above	22.8%	26.3%	21.6%	24.8%
Marital Status				
Married (2)	64.5%	65.7%	65.8%	64.7%
Divorced	6.8%	7.4%	6.0%	7.8%
Widowed	6.4%	5.2%	5.6%	4.9%
Single	22.2%	21.8%	22.6%	22.5%
Unknown cases	0.1%			
Number of Children				
No children	26.3%	25.4%	26.4%	26.1%
One child	11.4%	10.5%	11.1%	9.8%
Two children	21.7%	20.1%	21.7%	20.1%
Three children	18.9%	21.7%	18.9%	21.2%
Four children	9.5%	10.6%	9.5%	10.4%
Five children and above	12.1%	11.7%	12.4%	12.3%
Unknown cases	0.1%	0.1%		
Level of Education				
Academic education	26.3%	32.9%	25.6%	32.8%
Non-academic education	71.7%	66.9%	74.4%	67.2%
Unknown cases	2.0%	0.2%		
Employment Status				
Employed	61.3%	68.9%	59.5%	66.5%
Unemployed	5.0%	3.7%	4.8%	2.5%
Does not belong to the labor force	33.7%	27.5%	35.7%	31.0%
Household Expenditures Coverage				
Not managing at all	NA	6.1%	NA	6.3%
Not managing that much	NA	23.4%	NA	23.9%
Managing	NA	50.4%	NA	50.9%
Managing without any difficulty	NA	19.1%	NA	18.9%
Unknown cases	NA	1.1%	NA	

- (1) Source: Israel's Social Survey (ICBS). Representative samples of Israel's adult population (ages 20 and above) in 2009 and 2019. For further information, please see the "Data and Methods" section and "Text 1" in the appendix.
- (2) Including living separately – 64 respondents in round 2009 and 48 respondents in round 2019.
- (3) Percentages were calculated out of Jews.
- (4) Percentages were calculated out of Muslims.

Results and Discussion

Trends in the Support of Attitudes

Table 2 includes findings of seven attitudes in accordance with the SDT. These findings refer to the proportions of the more supportive views among the adult population of Israel in years 2009 and 2019. Hence, findings of this table can sufficiently test hypothesis 1. Additionally, each attitude and year include such proportions by various characteristics.

The results in Table 2 show that in five attitudes, the proportions of support have increased substantially during 2009-2019 among the total population.

During 2009-2019, the most moderate increase was found in the proportion of respondents who prefer a family with two children or less (from 14.0% to 17.2%). More considerable rises were found in supporting familial arrangements alternative to marriage, such as accepting unmarried couples' parenthood (from 30.5% to 43.3%) and perceiving single-parenthood as good as couple-parenthood (from 31.2% to 43.3%). However, the most extreme increases in these proportions were found in attitudes related to the postponement of establishing a family. During 2009-2019, there was a substantial rise in the preference for establishing a family for men aged 30 and above (from 22.8% to 39.1%, a relative increase of 71.3%), and especially for women aged 30 and above (from 5.8% to 16.1%, a relative increase of 177.3%).¹⁷

The rise in the support of all five attitudes above is not confined to the general population. For each of these attitudes, almost all sub-groups experienced a rise in support during this period. It is well illustrated regarding the preference for establishing a family for women aged 30 and above. The increase in support of this attitude was evident among all religions, at all levels of religiosity, among women, men, in all age-groups, and so forth.

Moreover, regarding these five attitudes, almost all sub-groups also experienced substantial rises of relative changes in the proportions of support appropriate to the general population. For instance, the proportion of accepting unmarried couples' parenthood has relatively increased substantially in the total population (by 41.7%) but also increased

¹⁷ It is striking to see the stark differences in the expectations for men compared to the expectations for women, which are far from being equal.

significantly among men (by 43.9%) among women (by 40.0%), in all marital statuses (ranging from 25.2% to 49.0%), as well as among other various sub-groups.

However, during 2009-2019, two out of the seven attitudes did not display a positive trend of support among the adult population of Israel.

In 2009, 57.5% supported the perception of childrearing at the expense of self-actualization, compared to 54.9% in 2019. This trend seems to be more stable rather than a decline. This is due to a very moderate relative decrease in this proportion (of -4.6%). Moreover, such stability is also apparent by observing trends of various sub-groups. First, although the level of support has decreased among most sub-groups, it has also increased among several sub-groups. Second, based on measuring the relative changes in the proportions of support, most sub-groups experienced a moderate change, whether positive or negative. For instance, such moderate relative changes were found both among men (-3.7%) and women (-5.4%), in all marital statuses (ranging from -7.9% to +3.7%), and among additional sub-groups. Therefore, the support of the perception of childrearing at the expense of self-actualization was relatively stable during 2009-2019.

However, during 2009-2019, among the general population, there was a moderate decline in support of the perception of divorce as the best solution in insolvable relationships (from 57.8% to 50.0%, a relative decrease of 13.4%). Despite this decline, this attitude was still more supported by the adult population of Israel than the other five attitudes, which revealed a substantial increase. Additionally, a more systematic observation indicates that almost all sub-groups experienced a decrease in support for this attitude. In other words, the decline in support was experienced among both sexes, in all age-groups, in all marital statuses, among people with academic and non-academic education, among Muslims and Jews (in all levels of religiosity), and so forth. The consistency of these negative trends, together with its relatively high support, might imply that the support of this attitude is leveling off.

In sum, despite the moderate decrease in the perception of divorce as the best solution in insolvable relationships, and although the stability in the perception of childrearing as being at the expense of self-actualization, it is especially clearly apparent that the levels of support of the other five attitudes, were substantially rising among the adult population of Israel. Moreover, such magnitudes of positive trends in supporting these five attitudes were also found among most sub-groups of Israel's population. Therefore, it seems that hypothesis 1 is

supported. The results of the other two attitudes, which do not show positive trends in the level of support, do not adequately reject this hypothesis.

Table 2: The Support of Attitudes in Accordance with the Second Demographic Transition among the Adult Population of Israel by Various Characteristics - 2009 and 2019 (1)

	<i>The proportion of the preference of establishing a family for <u>men</u> at age 30 and above (2)</i>		<i>The proportion of the preference of establishing a family for <u>women</u> at age 30 and above (3)</i>	
	2009	2019	2009	2019
Total	22.8%	39.1%	5.8%	16.1 %
Type of residence				
Urban	26.1%	42.2%	7.7%	19.0%
Suburban and rural	20.8%	36.5%	4.7%	13.8%
Area of Residence				
Jerusalem	10.8%	15.7%	3.2%	4.8%
Tel-Aviv	43.6%	72.1%	19.4%	44.8%
Other areas in Israel	22.5%	39.4%	5.0%	15.3%
Religious Affiliation				
Jewish	24.4%	41.8%	6.8%	19.0%
Muslim	13.1%	20.4%	1.3%	2.3%
Christian	19.6%	48.5%	1.6%	12.7%
Druze	18.7%	40.7%	1.8%	5.5%
Atheist	31.0%	68.6%	6.2%	29.2%
Level of Religiosity (Jews)				
Not religious, secular	35.3%	60.2%	11.6%	32.8%
Traditional not that religious	26.6%	46.8%	5.8%	16.1%
Traditional-religious	16.4%	36.2%	3.0%	10.1%
Religious	5.5%	10.3%	0.8%	3.4%
Orthodox	1.6%	0.7%	0.2%	0.2%
Level of Religiosity (Muslims)				
Not religious	20.6%	38.0%	1.2%	4.1%
Not religious that much	10.2%	20.2%	1.6%	3.4%
Religious	13.5%	17.3%	1.3%	1.3%
Very religious	11.9%	19.3%	0.0%	0.0%
Place of Birth				
Born in Israel	24.3%	37.3%	7.2%	16.2%
Not born in Israel	20.1%	44.0%	3.2%	15.8%
Born in FSU (Jews)				
Jews who were born in the FSU	20.4%	48.0%	2.5%	16.7%
Jews who were not born in the FSU	25.2%	40.8%	7.6%	19.4%

Table 2 (Cont.): The Support of Attitudes in Accordance with the Second Demographic Transition among Adult Population of Israel by Various Characteristics - 2009 and 2019 (1)

	<i>The proportion of the preference of establishing a family for <u>men</u> at age 30 and above (2)</i>		<i>The proportion of the preference of establishing a family for <u>women</u> at age 30 and above (3)</i>	
	2009	2019	2009	2019
Total	22.8%	39.1%	5.8%	16.1%
Sex				
Men	17.8%	35.5%	3.8%	14.4%
Women	27.5%	42.5%	7.7%	17.7%
Age				
20-29	19.7%	27.3%	4.6%	10.6%
30-39	33.1%	46.9%	10.6%	20.4%
40-49	24.3%	43.1%	7.3%	21.0%
50-59	19.6%	38.2%	4.0%	16.0%
60 and above	16.7%	41.1%	2.3%	14.0%
Marital Status				
Married	19.7%	35.9%	4.1%	14.1%
Divorced	34.4%	57.2%	10.6%	26.0%
Widowed	18.7%	32.9%	2.4%	8.3%
Single	29.8%	43.5%	10.2%	20.4%
Number of Children				
No children	28.7%	41.6%	9.2%	18.8%
One child	29.9%	47.5%	7.9%	18.7%
Two children	26.7%	51.7%	6.1%	23.5%
Three children	20.8%	41.8%	4.8%	17.1%
Four children	13.8%	26.6%	1.9%	7.9%
Five children and above	7.4%	13.9%	0.6%	2.4%
Level of Education				
Academic education	32.6%	51.9%	10.8%	25.6%
Non-academic education	19.8%	33.1%	4.3%	11.6%
Employment Status				
Employed	26.6%	42.2%	7.3%	18.4%
Unemployed	27.0%	45.2%	7.3%	23.4%
Does not belong to the labor force	15.9%	31.8%	3.0%	10.6%
Household Expenditures Coverage				
Not managing at all	NA	36.7%	NA	13.8%
Not managing that much	NA	33.8%	NA	12.2%
Managing	NA	39.4%	NA	15.6%
Managing without any difficulty	NA	45.9%	NA	23.0%

Table 2 (Cont.): The Support of Attitudes in Accordance with the Second Demographic Transition among Adult Population of Israel by Various Characteristics - 2009 and 2019 (1)

	<i>The proportion of the preference of a family with two children or less (4)</i>		<i>The proportion of the perception of divorce as the best solution in insolvable relationships (5)</i>	
	<i>2009</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2019</i>
Total	14.0%	17.2%	57.8%	50.0%
Type of residence				
Urban	14.9%	17.6%	59.3%	51.5%
Suburban and rural	13.5%	16.9%	56.9%	48.9%
Area of Residence				
Jerusalem	10.8%	6.6%	56.5%	40.6%
Tel-Aviv	19.4%	24.8%	62.2%	59.1%
Other areas in Israel	13.9%	17.8%	57.6%	50.4%
Religious Affiliation				
Jewish	13.1%	14.8%	58.4%	50.5%
Muslim	12.0%	19.0%	52.6%	42.7%
Christian	27.5%	36.7%	53.3%	56.0%
Druze	21.7%	25.7%	57.3%	56.5%
Atheist	35.7%	53.9%	72.0%	71.9%
Level of Religiosity (Jews)				
Not religious, secular	20.1%	23.9%	66.0%	60.1%
Traditional not that religious	11.8%	14.0%	58.6%	50.6%
Traditional-religious	6.0%	6.5%	60.3%	48.4%
Religious	2.1%	1.2%	47.1%	41.3%
Orthodox	0.6%	0.0%	31.1%	21.2%
Level of Religiosity (Muslims)				
Not religious	22.7%	36.8%	67.2%	43.0%
Not religious that much	10.1%	24.4%	42.8%	49.1%
Religious	12.5%	13.2%	54.0%	38.6%
Very religious	2.9%	14.7%	59.5%	52.1%
Place of Birth				
Born in Israel	10.7%	15.2%	52.4%	45.8%
Not born in Israel	19.9%	22.6%	67.7%	61.5%
Born in FSU (Jews)				
Jews who were born in the FSU	30.4%	29.3%	67.0%	62.9%
Jews who were not born in the FSU	9.3%	12.3%	56.7%	48.4%

Table 2 (Cont.): The Support of Attitudes in Accordance with the Second Demographic Transition among Adult Population of Israel by Various Characteristics - 2009 and 2019 (1)

	<i>The proportion of the preference of a family with two children or less (4)</i>		<i>The proportion of the perception of divorce as the best solution in insolvable relationships (5)</i>	
	<i>2009</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2019</i>
Total	14.0%	17.2%	57.8%	50.0%
Sex				
Men	14.0%	18.3%	55.7%	47.1%
Women	14.0%	16.2%	59.8%	52.8%
Age				
20-29	13.4%	18.1%	46.2%	38.1%
30-39	13.9%	18.4%	50.7%	41.5%
40-49	14.5%	16.6%	56.3%	52.1%
50-59	14.1%	18.0%	67.2%	53.3%
60 and above	14.4%	15.5%	72.5%	64.4%
Marital Status				
Married	11.9%	14.4%	57.3%	47.9%
Divorced	24.6%	22.5%	77.7%	71.6%
Widowed	15.0%	15.3%	69.5%	64.0%
Single	17.0%	23.9%	51.3%	45.6%
Number of Children				
No children	17.1%	23.5%	50.9%	43.1%
One child	27.2%	29.3%	60.9%	58.7%
Two children	18.2%	24.9%	62.1%	57.2%
Three children	5.1%	6.9%	62.5%	54.2%
Four children	7.5%	7.8%	59.5%	49.8%
Five children and above	5.4%	6.1%	53.9%	39.1%
Level of Education				
Academic education	17.7%	19.0%	59.1%	53.5%
Non-academic education	13.0%	16.4%	57.6%	48.4%
Employment Status				
Employed	14.7%	17.5%	56.5%	48.3%
Unemployed	15.6%	20.7%	57.2%	52.8%
Does not belong to the labor force	12.6%	16.3%	60.2%	53.7%
Household Expenditures Coverage				
Not managing at all	NA	16.4%	NA	46.7%
Not managing that much	NA	16.7%	NA	46.0%
Managing	NA	17.8%	NA	51.9%
Managing without any difficulty	NA	15.9%	NA	51.6%

Table 2 (Cont.): The Support of Attitudes in Accordance with the Second Demographic Transition among Adult Population of Israel by Various Characteristics - 2009 and 2019 (1)

	<i>The proportion of the acceptance of unmarried couples' parenthood (6)</i>		<i>The proportion of the perception of single-parenthood as good as couple-parenthood (7)</i>	
	<i>2009</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2019</i>
Total	30.5%	43.3%	31.2%	43.3%
Type of residence				
Urban	34.3%	47.7%	31.8%	44.7%
Suburban and rural	28.1%	39.6%	30.8%	42.1%
Area of Residence				
Jerusalem	16.5%	21.0%	26.5%	22.7%
Tel-Aviv	52.7%	76.4%	37.4%	65.4%
Other areas in Israel	30.3%	43.3%	31.2%	43.9%
Religious Affiliation				
Jewish	35.0%	52.0%	33.3%	47.6%
Muslim	3.3%	2.5%	22.2%	21.6%
Christian	22.7%	29.7%	27.3%	37.5%
Druze	3.1%	5.1%	5.5%	30.0%
Atheist	51.6%	64.3%	25.4%	56.3%
Level of Religiosity (Jews)				
Not religious, secular	56.1%	77.2%	40.6%	60.4%
Traditional not that religious	33.1%	53.6%	34.5%	51.5%
Traditional-religious	17.3%	33.9%	32.0%	42.6%
Religious	8.2%	16.8%	22.8%	29.7%
Orthodox	1.1%	2.6%	9.7%	10.8%
Level of Religiosity (Muslims)				
Not religious	7.5%	7.5%	22.7%	22.8%
Not religious that much	5.8%	3.4%	25.8%	27.1%
Religious	1.4%	1.2%	20.1%	18.7%
Very religious	0.7%	2.8%	21.8%	17.6%
Place of Birth				
Born in Israel	30.2%	42.9%	32.1%	42.8%
Not born in Israel	31.2%	44.1%	29.6%	44.6%
Born in FSU (Jews)				
Jews who were born in the FSU	35.8%	44.3%	32.1%	43.4%
Jews who were not born in the FSU	34.8%	53.3%	33.6%	48.3%

Table 2 (Cont.): The Support of Attitudes in Accordance with the Second Demographic Transition among Adult Population of Israel by Various Characteristics - 2009 and 2019 (1)

	<i>The proportion of the acceptance of unmarried couples' parenthood (6)</i>		<i>The proportion of the perception of single-parenthood as good as couple-parenthood (7)</i>	
	2009	2019	2009	2019
Total	30.5%	43.3%	31.2%	43.3%
Sex				
Men	27.8%	40.0%	25.7%	36.1%
Women	33.1%	46.3%	36.4%	50.1%
Age				
20-29	27.1%	37.9%	34.6%	43.6%
30-39	39.0%	46.9%	32.7%	43.2%
40-49	32.9%	50.1%	31.4%	47.5%
50-59	30.3%	42.6%	31.0%	44.7%
60 and above	23.8%	40.4%	25.8%	39.0%
Marital Status				
Married	27.4%	38.9%	27.3%	39.0%
Divorced	51.0%	63.8%	47.6%	59.6%
Widowed	21.8%	32.5%	26.8%	38.6%
Single	36.5%	50.9%	39.1%	50.9%
Number of Children				
No children	34.2%	48.4%	37.1%	49.1%
One child	41.7%	50.2%	35.2%	45.9%
Two children	38.6%	53.9%	31.6%	48.3%
Three children	33.2%	50.8%	31.7%	45.7%
Four children	16.9%	27.6%	23.2%	35.3%
Five children and above	4.9%	9.6%	19.6%	22.8%
Level of Education				
Academic education	47.4%	58.3%	32.5%	50.9%
Non-academic education	25.5%	35.9%	31.0%	39.6%
Employment Status				
Employed	36.7%	49.4%	32.6%	46.8%
Unemployed	32.4%	46.5%	36.8%	50.4%
Does not belong to the labor force	19.9%	29.7%	28.1%	35.1%
Household Expenditures Coverage				
Not managing at all	NA	39.6%	NA	43.8%
Not managing that much	NA	32.1%	NA	37.2%
Managing	NA	44.3%	NA	43.0%
Managing without any difficulty	NA	56.0%	NA	51.3%

Table 2 (Cont.): The Support of Attitudes in Accordance with the Second Demographic Transition among Adult Population of Israel by Various Characteristics - 2009 and 2019 (1)

	<i>The proportion of the perception of childrearing at the expense of self-actualization (8)</i>	
	2009	2019
Total	57.5%	54.9%
Type of residence		
Urban	55.8%	53.9%
Suburban and rural	58.6%	55.6%
Area of Residence		
Jerusalem	68.0%	64.3%
Tel-Aviv	49.5%	54.9%
Other areas in Israel	57.0%	53.8%
Religious Affiliation		
Jewish	52.1%	49.2%
Muslim	88.1%	82.9%
Christian	67.7%	62.7%
Druze	93.6%	80.0%
Atheist	39.0%	43.5%
Level of Religiosity (Jews)		
Not religious, secular	48.9%	50.1%
Traditional not that religious	56.3%	53.7%
Traditional-religious	64.3%	56.2%
Religious	46.5%	40.4%
Orthodox	44.1%	36.7%
Level of Religiosity (Muslims)		
Not religious	87.7%	81.4%
Not religious that much	85.9%	80.6%
Religious	88.7%	84.7%
Very religious	92.2%	79.6%
Place of Birth		
Born in Israel	60.2%	56.5%
Not born in Israel	52.5%	50.5%
Born in FSU (Jews)		
Jews who were born in the FSU	43.6%	48.1%
Jews who were not born in the FSU	53.9%	49.4%

Table 2 (Cont.): The Support of Attitudes in Accordance with the Second Demographic Transition among Adult Population of Israel by Various Characteristics - 2009 and 2019 (1)

	<i>The proportion of the perception of childrearing at the expense of self-actualization (8)</i>	
	2009	2019
Total	57.5%	54.9%
Sex		
Men	59.0%	56.9%
Women	56.0%	53.0%
Age		
20-29	51.7%	53.0%
30-39	56.0%	53.8%
40-49	56.7%	53.9%
50-59	61.2%	54.5%
60 and above	63.4%	58.3%
Marital Status		
Married	59.2%	54.5%
Divorced	53.4%	55.4%
Widowed	63.5%	62.7%
Single	52.2%	54.0%
Number of Children		
No children	51.2%	54.2%
One child	49.3%	51.8%
Two children	53.5%	53.6%
Three children	59.6%	53.6%
Four children	69.5%	58.3%
Five children and above	72.8%	60.0%
Level of Education		
Academic education	43.6%	46.6%
Non-academic education	61.8%	59.0%
Employment Status		
Employed	53.4%	51.9%
Unemployed	55.5%	53.9%
Does not belong to the labor force	64.6%	61.6%
Household Expenditures Coverage		
Not managing at all	NA	64.5%
Not managing that much	NA	63.4%
Managing	NA	51.6%
Managing without any difficulty	NA	49.4%

- (1) Source: Israel's Social Survey (ICBS). Representative samples of Israel's adult population (ages 20 and above) in 2009 and 2019. Sample sizes: 7,462 and 7,575 respondents, respectively. All proportions refer to the weighted total population of adults in Israel. For further information, please see the "Data and Methods" section and "Text 1" in the appendix.
- (2) Missing cases: 2.17% in 2009 and 7.54% in 2019. All proportions were calculated out of known cases.
- (3) Missing cases: 2.05% in 2009 and 7.04% in 2019. All proportions were calculated out of known cases.
- (4) Missing cases: 7.54% in 2009 and 8.05% in 2019. All proportions were calculated out of known cases.
- (5) Missing cases: 1.98% in 2009 and 2.48% in 2019. All proportions were calculated out of known cases.
- (6) Missing cases: 0.64% in 2009 and 0.65% in 2019. All proportions were calculated out of known cases.
- (7) Missing cases: 1.03% in 2009 and 1.36% in 2019. All proportions were calculated out of known cases.
- (8) Missing cases: 0.99% in 2009 and 2.10% in 2019. All proportions were calculated out of known cases.

Differences in the Support of Attitudes

As mentioned, findings in Table 2 also refer to differences between sub-groups of Israel's population in their support of SDT attitudes. These differences are reflected in demographic and SES characteristics and in geographical and faith characteristics. This current sub-section tries to provide adequate answers to the first group of research questions.

Some differences were found regarding **demographic characteristics**. Compared to men, women were mostly more supportive of SDT attitudes. The differences between them, however, were not substantial. Moderate differences were also found between people born in Israel and people born abroad, except for perceiving divorce as the best solution in insolvable relationships. Here the latter were considerably more supportive than the former. Such patterns were also found among Jews who were born in the FSU and Jews who were not born in the FSU. Here the formers were not only considerably supportive of the attitude that refers to divorce; they were also substantially more supportive in preferring a family with two children or less. Regarding marital status, it was found that the highest support levels were mostly among divorced people, while the lowest support levels were mostly among married and widowed people. However, the highest support was found among the widowed when it comes to perceiving childrearing at the expense of self-actualization. Age-groups had a parabolic pattern of support in some attitudes. Meaning the highest support levels were among people aged 30-49 regarding the preference of establishing a family for men and women aged 30 and above and the acceptance of unmarried couples' parenthood. This pattern was also found in perceiving single-parenthood as good as couple-parenthood (2019). Linear positive patterns of support among age-groups were found in the following attitudes: perceiving divorce as the best solution in insolvable relationships and perceiving childrearing at the expense of self-actualization. Regarding persons by number of children, the highest support levels of most attitudes were among persons with two or less children.

Differences in support of attitudes by **SES characteristics** were also found. However, they were not striking. Mostly, higher support levels were found among people with academic education compared to people with non-academic education. However, the latter were less likely to perceive childrearing at the expense of self-actualization. Regarding employment status, people who do not belong to the labor force were less supportive of most attitudes, except for perceiving divorce as the best solution in insolvable relationships and perceiving childrearing at the expense of self-actualization. As for household expenditures coverage, those managing without any difficulty mostly had the highest support levels. However, those who

were not managing that much, or not managing at all, had the highest support levels in perceiving childrearing at the expense of self-actualization.

Faith characteristics display interesting results. Discussing differences in support of SDT attitudes by religious affiliation is challenging. This is mainly because focusing merely on religious affiliation might disguise heterogeneity that stems from religiosity. This will be further discussed, but for now, this reason is well illustrated by the highest support levels among Atheists (2019),¹⁸ who are attributed as secular. Findings by religious affiliation will mainly focus on Muslims and Jews, who account for more than 90% of Israel's population. Regarding Christians and Druze, it is essential to mention that their support levels were mostly ranked between those of Jews and Muslims. However, in 2019 Christians and Druze had the highest support levels of preferring a family with two children or less and perceiving divorce as the best solution in insolvable relationships. Additionally, Christians were the most supportive in preferring establishing a family for men aged 30 and above.

Differences between Jews and Muslims were considerable in almost all attitudes (2019). However, certain attitudes were more supported by Muslims, and Jews more supported others. Muslims, compared to Jews, tended to prefer a family with two children or less (19.0% compared to 14.8%) and to perceive childrearing at the expense of self-actualization (82.9% compared to 49.2%). However, Jews, compared to Muslims, tended to be more supportive of attitudes regarding the postponement of establishing a family and of attitudes more related to living arrangements alternative to marriage. Such differences were apparent in the preferences of establishing a family for men aged 30 and above (41.8% compared to 20.4%) and for women aged 30 and above (19.0% compared to 2.3%), and especially substantial in the acceptance of unmarried couples' parenthood (52.0% compared to 2.5%). Therefore, it is not clear if one religious group is more supportive of an SDT than another.

However, scrutiny observations by the level of religiosity (2019) mostly show that less religious people tend to be more supportive of SDT attitudes. This was found both among Muslims and especially among Jews.

Compared to Muslims with higher levels of religiosity, Muslims with lower levels were more supportive of most attitudes. This is illustrated, for instance, regarding the preference of

¹⁸ Except for perceiving childrearing at the expense of self-actualization, where the lowest support was among the Atheists.

a family with two children or less (14.7% among very religious Muslims compared to 36.8% among Muslims who are not religious). However, such patterns by religiosity among Muslims were unclear regarding the perception of childrearing at the expense of self-actualization or the perception of divorce as the best solution in insolvable relationships.

Comparatively, Jews reveal extreme differences in the support of attitudes by levels of religiosity. Such differences were found in six attitudes, where the support has declined consistently and substantially across all five levels (from among those who are secular to among those who are orthodox). This pattern was especially evident in accepting unmarried couples' parenthood (from 77.2% to 53.6% to 33.9% to 16.8% to 2.6%). However, religiosity among Jews had a moderate parabolic pattern of support regarding the perception of childrearing at the expense of self-actualization. This support peaked among traditional-religious Jews (56.2%), but it was still higher among secular Jews (50.7%) than among orthodox Jews (36.7%).

Although people at higher levels of religiosity mostly tended to be less supportive of SDT attitudes, it is evident that this support increased during 2009-2019 in almost all levels of religiosity. Such positive trends were found both among Muslims and Jews. Such positive trends were mostly found among religious Jews, especially in accepting unmarried couples' parenthood (from 8.2% to 16.8%). However, during these years, a substantial increase was not found among orthodox Jews. Regarding certain attitudes, positive trends were also found among religious and very religious Muslims. For instance, during 2009-2019, very religious Muslims experienced a sharp rise in the preference for a family with two children or less (from 2.9% to 14.7%).

Last, differences in support of attitudes by **geographical characteristics** (2019) are based on their measure. Such an evaluation by type of residence shows that people who reside in urban environments were moderately more supportive of SDT attitudes than people who live in suburban and rural environments. However, from the perspective of the city of residence, it is apparent that Tel-Aviv residents were much more supportive of most SDT attitudes than Jerusalem residents. This was especially evident in preferring establishing a family at ages 30 and above for men (72.1% compared to 15.7%) and women (44.8% compared to 4.8%). However, these differences reversed regarding perceiving childrearing at the expense of self-actualization (54.9% compared to 64.3%).

The Probability to Support Attitudes

In this sub-section, results of multivariate analyses are discussed based on LPMs. An LPM is a linear regression with a binary dependent variable. Since it is a type of a linear regression, its coefficients are also comparable over models and groups. Additionally, the results of LPMs are in terms of probability changes (Mood, 2010). For instance, let's say that literacy is a dichotomous variable in LPMs of probabilities to support attitudes ABC and XYZ. Furthermore, in these LPMs, illiterate people are included in the reference category. Let's say that in the case of the LPM of attitude ABC, the coefficient of literate people was found to be positive, significant, and equaled 0.257. Therefore, literate people have a higher probability of supporting attitude ABC by 0.257 points on average compared to illiterate people. Additionally, regarding the LPM of attitude XYZ, let's say that the coefficient of literate people was found to be negative, significant, and equaled -0.468. Therefore, in this case, literate people have a lower probability of supporting attitude XYZ by 0.468 points on average compared to illiterate people.

In this sub-section, Tables 3-7 include LPMs of the probabilities to be more supportive of attitudes in accordance with the SDT (2019). Such probabilities are measured for five attitudes as follows: to prefer establishing a family for women aged 30 and above ([Table 3](#)); to prefer a family with two children or less ([Table 4](#)); to perceive divorce as the best solution in insolvable relationships ([Table 5](#)); to accept unmarried couples' parenthood ([Table 6](#)); and to perceive childrearing as at the expense of self-actualization ([Table 7](#)). Each table contains five LPMs which are unified by structure based on clusters of independent variables. Meaning in each table, the structures of the models are as follows: [Model 1](#) includes demographic independent variables; [Model 2](#) includes demographic and SES independent variables; [Model 3](#) includes demographic, SES, and geographical independent variables; [Model 4](#) includes all independent variables (i.e., demographic, SES, geographical and faith variables); [Model 5](#) has demographic and faith independent variables. Results in these tables will enable us to test Hypotheses 2-4.

An overall observation of all 25 LPMs shows that all models and their Y-intercepts were significant. The number of respondents in all models ranged from 6,880 to 7,523 persons (i.e., all models include over 90% of all ISS respondents). Additionally, proportions of variation explained (R-squared) of [Models 4](#)¹⁹ were relatively small for three attitudes:

¹⁹ I.e., models that include all independent variables.

perceiving childrearing at the expense of self-actualization (8.4%), perceiving divorce as the best solution in insolvable relationships (9.7%), and preferring a family with two children or less (11.0%). The proportion of variation explained was higher regarding preferring establishing a family for women aged 30 and above (16.0%) and substantially higher for accepting unmarried couples' parenthood (38.1%). This sub-section continues by referring to the effects of demographic and SES variables, and it mainly focuses on analyzing the effects of geographical and faith variables.

Demographic variables mostly contributed substantially to the explained variations of the probability to support SDT attitudes,²⁰ especially to attitudes of perceiving divorce as the best solution in insolvable relationships and preferring a family with two children or less. However, demographic variables had a minute contribution to the explained variation of perceiving childrearing at the expense of self-actualization.

Among the demographic variables, it appears that age had substantial effects on the probability of supporting SDT attitudes. Age mostly had a parabolic pattern of effect, seemingly peaking close to its mean. Additionally, age seemed to have a positive linear effect regarding the perception of divorce as the best solution in insolvable relationships and also to the perception of childrearing at the expense of self-actualization. Furthermore, in most cases, the range of probabilities²¹ of age was substantially wide, even when all independent variables were controlled. The number of children seemed to have substantial negative effects on the probability of supporting attitudes. However, when faith variables were considered, these effects were mostly reduced. But while evaluating the probability of preferring a family with two children or less, this variable seemed to have the most substantial impact, even when all variables were considered. Sex and place of birth mostly had significant effects on the probability of supporting attitudes. However, their effects were relatively weak and inconsistent. The effects of marital statuses were mostly insignificant or weak for the widowed and single (compared to the married). However, the effects of the divorced (compared to the married) were mostly significant and positive. These effects seemed substantial in the variation

²⁰ Based on comparing R-squared proportions of models 1 to those of models 4 and 5.

²¹ Range of probabilities refers to the gap between the value with the highest and the lowest probabilities of supporting an attitude.

of two attitudes: perceiving divorce as the best solution in insolvable relationships and accepting unmarried couples' parenthood, even when all variables were considered.

The contributions of **SES variables** to the explained variations of SDT attitudes were usually minute or otherwise small.²² All three SES variables were inconsistent in their directions and mostly weak.

Geographical variables had a marginal contribution to the explained variations of SDT attitudes.²³ It seems that type of residence does not influence SDT attitudes. According to models 3, not all of its effects were significant, and those significant were not substantial or consistent in their directions. Moreover, in models 4, when faith variables were controlled, none of the coefficients of type of residence were significant. Therefore, hypothesis 3 is supported, which means that it seems that residing in Israel's urban, suburban, and rural areas does not influence the level of support of attitudes in accordance with the SDT.

Regarding the area of residence, models 3 and 4 display results that are partly sufficient for supporting hypothesis 4. The effects of residing in Tel-Aviv (compared to other areas in Israel) were not always significant, even in most models 4. Despite that, residing in Tel-Aviv had positive and substantial effects on the probability of preferring establishing a family for women aged 30 and above and on the probability of accepting unmarried couples' parenthood. These effects were substantial even after faith variables were considered (models 4), and they equaled 0.184 and 0.126 points on average. And yet, according to models 3, residing in Jerusalem (compared to other areas in Israel) mostly had a weak negative effect on the probability of supporting SDT attitudes. However, most of these effects were insignificant when faith variables were controlled (models 4). Unexpectedly, residing in Jerusalem positively influenced the probability of perceiving childrearing at the expense of self-actualization (of 0.046 points on average), even after faith variables were considered. In sum, hypothesis 4 is partly supported. Meaning residing in these cities does not necessarily influence the probability of supporting SDT attitudes, even if Tel-Aviv residents mostly tended to be more supportive of SDT attitudes compared to Jerusalem residents (as shown in the previous

²² Based on subtracting the R-squared proportions of models 1 from those of models 2 and by subtracting the R-squared proportions of models 4 from those of models 5 (in each table).

²³ Based on subtracting the R-squared proportions of models 2 from those of models 3 and by subtracting the R-squared proportions of models 4 from those of models 5 (in each table).

sub-section). And yet, residing in Tel-Aviv had positive and considerable influences on the probability of supporting attitudes that are related to essential aspects of the SDT theory, such as women's autonomy and extra-marital births (Lesthaeghe, 2010; Lesthaeghe, 2014).

Faith variables had a substantial contribution to explained variations of most SDT attitudes.²⁴ For instance, this is well illustrated by subtracting the R-squared proportions of models 3 from models 4 and discovering that faith variables contributed approximately 4.9% out of 8.4% of the explained variation of perceiving childrearing at the expense of self-actualization, moreover, by finding out that faith variables substantially contributed about 20.3% out of 38.1% of the explained variation of accepting unmarried couples' parenthood. The other three attitudes also had relatively substantial contributions from faith variables.

Results of models 4 show different directions of effects for each religious affiliation. Hence, belonging to a particular religion can have positive, negative, or even no effects on supporting certain SDT attitudes. Therefore, in 2019 there is no consistent association between religious affiliation and the support of SDT attitudes.

Actual results in models 4 further elaborate on this indication. For instance, Jews had a probability of accepting unmarried couples' parenthood by 0.272 points higher on average than people with other religious affiliations. However, Jews had the probability of preferring a family with two children or less by 0.175 points lower on average compared to people with other religious affiliations. Furthermore, Muslims had a probability of perceiving childrearing at the expense of self-actualization by 0.196 points higher on average than people with other religious affiliations. However, Muslims had a probability of accepting unmarried couples' parenthood by 0.106 points lower on average than people with other religious affiliations.

Models 4 show clearly that almost all the effects of religiosity were significant, negative, and substantial.²⁵ Religiosity seemingly had the most substantial effect on the variations of the preference of establishing a family for women at ages 30 and above. Compared

²⁴ Based on subtracting the R-squared proportions of models 3 from those of models 4 and by subtracting the R-squared proportions of models 1 from those of models 5 (in each table).

²⁵ Religiosity had only two insignificant coefficients, which appeared while evaluating the probability of perceiving childrearing at the expense of self-actualization. However, Model 4 in the table included a significant and substantial coefficient that compared orthodox or very religious people to secular people (by -0.144 points on average). Hence, religiosity had a considerable effect on this attitude.

to secular people, all effects were substantial, including the coefficients regarding people who are not religious that much (-0.135 points on average), and regarding religious people (-0.185 points on average), and orthodox or very religious people (-0.237 points on average). However, religiosity enormously influenced the probability of accepting unmarried couples' parenthood. Meaning people who are not religious that much had a probability of supporting this attitude by 0.226 points lower on average compared to secular people. Furthermore, religious people had a probability of supporting this attitude by 0.418 points lower on average than secular people. And finally, orthodox or very religious people had a probability of supporting this attitude by 0.658 points lower on average compared to secular people. Among all effects appearing in models 4, this was the strongest. Religiosity seemingly had a substantial influence on additional SDT attitudes, such as preferring a family with two children or less (its coefficients ranged from about -0.086 to -0.148 points on average) and perceiving divorce as the best solution in insolvable relationships (its coefficients ranged from -0.075 to -0.274 points on average)

Therefore, hypothesis 2 is supported. Meaning among Israel's adult population, the level of religiosity has a negative and substantial influence on the level of support of attitudes in accordance with the SDT, even when other influences are considered.

Table 3: Results from multivariate linear probability models of the probabilities of preferring establishing a family for women at age 30 and above, among the adult population of Israel, 2019

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Constant	0.343**	0.238**	0.218**	0.277**	0.324**
Sex					
Women (reference)	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Men	-0.044**	-0.039**	-0.038**	-0.041**	-0.048**
Age					
Squared deviation from the mean of age	-0.0002**	-0.0002**	-0.0002**	-0.0002**	-0.0002**
Deviation from the mean of age	0.0044**	0.0039**	0.0032**	0.0014**	0.0020**
Marital Status					
Married (reference)	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Divorced	0.068**	0.086**	0.083**	0.069**	0.060**
Widowed	-0.031	-0.019	-0.022	-0.026	-0.029
Single	0.068**	0.085**	0.073**	0.062**	0.060**
Number of Children	-0.042**	-0.035**	-0.029**	-0.009**	-0.013**
Place of Birth					
Born in Israel (reference)	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Not born in Israel	-0.026*	-0.030**	-0.028*	-0.047**	-0.053**
Level of Education					
Non-academic education (reference)		Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	
Academic education		0.109**	0.099**	0.068**	
Employment Status					
Employed		0.005	0.001	-0.021*	
Unemployed or does not belong to the labor force (ref.)		Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	
Household Expenditures Coverage		0.018**	0.014*	0.002	
Type of residence					
Urban			0.028**	0.011	
Suburban and rural (reference)			Ref.	Ref.	
Area of residence					
Jerusalem			-0.085**	-0.024	
Tel-Aviv			0.206**	0.184**	
Other areas in Israel (reference)			Ref.	Ref.	
Religious Affiliation					
Jewish				0.072**	0.086**
Muslim				-0.016	-0.019
Other religious affiliations (reference)				Ref.	Ref.
Level of Religiosity					
Secular (reference)				Ref.	Ref.
Not religious that much				-0.135**	-0.155**
Religious				-0.185**	-0.208**
Orthodox or very religious				-0.237**	-0.264**
N	7,038	6,979	6,979	6,958	7,015
R-Squared	0.062	0.084	0.108	0.160	0.138

Source: Israel's Social Survey, 2019. A representative sample of Israel's adult population (ages 20 and above).

Sample size: 7,575 respondents.

** p<0.01; * p<0.05

Table 4: Results from multivariate linear probability models of the probabilities of preferring a family with two children or less, among the adult population of Israel, 2019

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Constant	0.287**	0.329**	0.335**	0.492**	0.468**
Sex					
Women (reference)	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Men	0.017	0.022*	0.023*	0.019*	0.014
Age					
Squared deviation from the mean of age	-0.0001**	-0.0001**	-0.0001**	-0.0001**	-0.0001**
Deviation from the mean of age	0.0021**	0.0020**	0.0018**	0.0014**	0.0016**
Marital Status					
Married (reference)	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Divorced	0.034	0.031	0.031	0.034	0.037
Widowed	0.022	0.020	0.019	0.016	0.018
Single	0.024	0.022	0.022	0.019	0.022
Number of Children	-0.050**	-0.051**	-0.049**	-0.037**	-0.038**
Place of Birth					
Born in Israel (reference)	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Not born in Israel	0.073**	0.070**	0.070**	0.065**	0.070**
Level of Education					
Non-academic education (reference)		Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	
Academic education		0.018	0.018	0.009	
Employment Status					
Employed		-0.026*	-0.030**	-0.018	
Unemployed or does not belong to the labor force (ref.)		Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	
Household Expenditures Coverage		-0.015**	-0.017**	-0.014*	
Type of residence					
Urban			-0.005	0.018	
Suburban and rural (reference)			Ref.	Ref.	
Area of residence					
Jerusalem			-0.064**	-0.070**	
Tel-Aviv			0.028	0.014	
Other areas in Israel (reference)			Ref.	Ref.	
Religious Affiliation					
Jewish				-0.175**	-0.175**
Muslim				-0.029	-0.033
Other religious affiliations (reference)				Ref.	Ref.
Level of Religiosity					
Secular (reference)				Ref.	Ref.
Not religious that much				-0.086**	-0.089**
Religious				-0.148**	-0.155**
Orthodox or very religious				-0.125**	-0.135**
N	6,963	6,901	6,901	6,880	6,940
R-Squared	0.059	0.059	0.062	0.110	0.109

Source: Israel's Social Survey, 2019. A representative sample of Israel's adult population (ages 20 and above).
Sample size: 7,575 respondents.

** p<0.01; * p<0.05

Table 5: Results from multivariate linear probability models of the probabilities of perceiving divorce as the best solution in insolvable relationships, among the adult population of Israel, 2019

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Constant	0.603**	0.565**	0.568**	0.644**	0.662**
Sex					
Women (reference)	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Men	-0.050**	-0.048**	-0.048**	-0.050**	-0.052**
Age					
Squared deviation from the mean of age	-0.0001**	-0.0001**	-0.0001**	0.0000	0.0000
Deviation from the mean of age	0.0078**	0.0076**	0.0074**	0.0056**	0.0059**
Marital Status					
Married (reference)	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Divorced	0.145**	0.157**	0.157**	0.149**	0.140**
Widowed	0.004	0.010	0.009	0.003	0.001
Single	0.046*	0.049*	0.048*	0.034	0.035
Number of Children	-0.036**	-0.034**	-0.032**	-0.011*	-0.013**
Place of Birth					
Born in Israel (reference)	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Not born in Israel	0.053**	0.052**	0.053**	0.044**	0.043**
Level of Education					
Non-academic education (reference)		Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	
Academic education		0.030*	0.029*	0.011	
Employment Status					
Employed		-0.009	-0.012	-0.021	
Unemployed or does not belong to the labor force (ref.)		Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	
Household Expenditures Coverage		0.014	0.013	0.012	
Type of residence					
Urban			-0.003	0.009	
Suburban and rural (reference)			Ref.	Ref.	
Area of residence					
Jerusalem			-0.048*	-0.022	
Tel-Aviv			0.042	0.024	
Other areas in Israel (reference)			Ref.	Ref.	
Religious Affiliation					
Jewish				-0.053*	-0.051*
Muslim				-0.020	-0.023
Other religious affiliations (reference)				Ref.	Ref.
Level of Religiosity					
Secular (reference)				Ref.	Ref.
Not religious that much				-0.075**	-0.081**
Religious				-0.133**	-0.139**
Orthodox or very religious				-0.274**	-0.277**
N	7,383	7,312	7,312	7,289	7,357
R-Squared	0.073	0.076	0.077	0.097	0.096

Source: Israel's Social Survey, 2019. A representative sample of Israel's adult population (ages 20 and above).

Sample size: 7,575 respondents.

** p<0.01; * p<0.05

Table 6: Results from multivariate linear probability models of the probabilities of accepting unmarried couples' parenthood, among the adult population of Israel, 2019

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Constant	0.763**	0.479**	0.449**	0.513**	0.602**
Sex					
Women (reference)	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Men	-0.077**	-0.080**	-0.078**	-0.083**	-0.085**
Age					
Squared deviation from the mean of age	-0.0004**	-0.0003**	-0.0002**	-0.0002**	-0.0002**
Deviation from the mean of age	0.0069**	0.0066**	0.0057**	-0.0001	0.0000
Marital Status					
Married (reference)	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Divorced	0.144**	0.174**	0.172**	0.117**	0.105**
Widowed	-0.016	0.009	0.006	-0.007	-0.012
Single	0.069**	0.098**	0.088**	0.049**	0.045**
Number of Children	-0.087**	-0.073**	-0.064**	-0.007*	-0.010**
Place of Birth					
Born in Israel (reference)	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Not born in Israel	-0.027*	-0.037**	-0.041**	-0.095**	-0.099**
Level of Education					
Non-academic education (reference)		Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	
Academic education		0.156**	0.147**	0.068**	
Employment Status					
Employed		0.114**	0.105**	0.025*	
Unemployed or does not belong to the labor force (ref.)		Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	
Household Expenditures Coverage		0.046**	0.041**	0.006	
Type of residence					
Urban			0.068**	0.009	
Suburban and rural (reference)			Ref.	Ref.	
Area of residence					
Jerusalem			-0.174**	0.012	
Tel-Aviv			0.174**	0.126**	
Other areas in Israel (reference)			Ref.	Ref.	
Religious Affiliation					
Jewish				0.272**	0.285**
Muslim				-0.106**	-0.114**
Other religious affiliations (reference)				Ref.	Ref.
Level of Religiosity					
Secular (reference)				Ref.	Ref.
Not religious that much				-0.226**	-0.242**
Religious				-0.418**	-0.439**
Orthodox or very religious				-0.658**	-0.686**
N	7,523	7,445	7,445	7,420	7,495
R-Squared	0.115	0.158	0.178	0.381	0.372

Source: Israel's Social Survey, 2019. A representative sample of Israel's adult population (ages 20 and above).
Sample size: 7,575 respondents.

** p<0.01; * p<0.05

Table 7: Results from multivariate linear probability models of the probabilities of perceiving childrearing at the expense of self-actualization, among the adult population of Israel, 2019

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Constant	0.522**	0.738**	0.751**	0.717**	0.586**
Sex					
Women (reference)	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Men	0.039**	0.043**	0.041**	0.040**	0.041**
Age					
Squared deviation from the mean of age	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Deviation from the mean of age	0.0011*	0.0015**	0.0018**	0.0018**	0.0017**
Marital Status					
Married (reference)	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Divorced	0.025	-0.001	-0.001	0.015	0.039
Widowed	0.065*	0.051	0.050	0.050	0.059*
Single	0.016	0.000	-0.003	-0.005	0.013
Number of Children	0.005	-0.006	-0.009*	-0.005	-0.001
Place of Birth					
Born in Israel (reference)	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Not born in Israel	-0.083**	-0.079**	-0.070**	-0.042**	-0.042**
Level of Education					
Non-academic education (reference)		Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	
Academic education		-0.091**	-0.093**	-0.081**	
Employment Status					
Employed		-0.060**	-0.054**	-0.027	
Unemployed or does not belong to the labor force (ref.)		Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	
Household Expenditures Coverage		-0.056**	-0.055**	-0.037**	
Type of residence					
Urban			-0.053**	0.002	
Suburban and rural (reference)			Ref.	Ref.	
Area of residence					
Jerusalem			0.116**	0.046*	
Tel-Aviv			0.059*	0.048	
Other areas in Israel (reference)			Ref.	Ref.	
Religious Affiliation					
Jewish				-0.104**	-0.120**
Muslim				0.196**	0.213**
Other religious affiliations (reference)				Ref.	Ref.
Level of Religiosity					
Secular (reference)				Ref.	Ref.
Not religious that much				0.022	0.039*
Religious				-0.006	0.015
Orthodox or very religious				-0.144**	-0.109**
N	7,412	7,337	7,337	7,312	7,384
R-Squared	0.009	0.031	0.035	0.084	0.071

Source: Israel's Social Survey, 2019. A representative sample of Israel's adult population (ages 20 and above).

Sample size: 7,575 respondents.

** p<0.01; * p<0.05

Conclusions

This current study indicates that during 2009-2019 Israel experienced a nationwide rise in the support of attitudes in accordance with the Second Demographic Transition (SDT). These results correspond with a basic assumption of the SDT theory that demographic behaviors are resulted and unfold together with societal changes (Lesthaeghe, 2014). This is because this rise occurred while demographic behaviors, which are typical to an SDT, became more common in Israel's population (ICBS, 2011a; UN, 2019; ICBS, 2021a; ICBS, 2021b; ICBS, 2021c; OECD, 2022; World Bank, 2022). Furthermore, this association also corresponds with previous findings about the SDT experience of secular Jews in Israel during the 1990s and 2000s (Bystrov, 2012).

The recent rise in support of SDT attitudes among the adult population of Israel is expressed by various views. Such views are related to the postponement of establishing a family, to extra-marital childrearing, and to preferring smaller families. This rise is well apparent despite a moderate decline in viewing divorce as the best solution in insolvable relationships. Furthermore, the substantial rise in support of SDT attitudes was not limited to the total population, but it was also experienced among various sub-groups of the Israeli society, including among people with higher levels of religiosity. Therefore, the study's first hypothesis is seemingly supported.

Likewise, the results of this study show that in Israel, religiosity is associated with the support of SDT attitudes. Meaning SDT views are more supported among people with lower levels of religiosity. The association between religiosity and the SDT in Israel was initially discovered among Jews (Bystrov, 2012). However, this current study includes a more systematic observation of the effects of religiosity on the support of SDT attitudes. The results indicate that the level of religiosity had a negative and substantial influence on the probability of supporting SDT attitudes. Hence the study's second hypothesis is seemingly supported.

Although previous research indicates an association between religious affiliation and the SDT in Israel (Bystrov, 2012), this current study did not include a hypothesis about religion. This decision is based on a sharp decline in the period TFR of Muslim women in recent years (ICBS, 2021b). The results of this study show an unclear and inconsistent association between religious affiliation and the support of SDT attitudes. Meaning certain views were more and less supported by Jews, as well as by Muslims. Despite this unclarity, continuing this follow-up is important due to the present changes in demographic behaviors in Israel.

Additionally, this study initially examined the associations between the SDT and aspects of the place of residence in Israel. The results show that type of residence (i.e., living in urban or suburban and rural environments) does not influence the probability of supporting SDT attitudes. Therefore, the study's third hypothesis is seemingly supported. Furthermore, differences between residing in Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv were also observed. It seemed that residents of Tel-Aviv mostly tended to be more supportive of SDT attitudes than residents of Jerusalem. However, their influences on the probability of supporting SDT attitudes were not always significant, and even when they were significant, they were not always substantial or consistent. However, residing in Tel-Aviv had substantial and positive effects on the probability of accepting unmarried couples' parenthood and on the probability of preferring establishing a family for women aged 30 and above. This was found even after the effects of religion and religiosity were controlled. Hence the fourth hypothesis was partly supported.

These conclusions are undoubtedly temporary in their essence. This is mainly due to population processes that already take place in Israel and are assumingly far from being completed. This alone serves as a sufficiently convincing reason to continue this study in the future. Since 2019, Israel has been experiencing a time of political instability. The future seems unclear, and nowadays, many choices are publicly debated. Many scientific questions can be raised while considering the interrelations between political changes and population processes. The future is interesting, no less than the past.

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Appendix

Figure 1: Total Fertility Rates of women in Israel and EU countries, 2019




Figure 2: Average number of people per household in Israel and EU countries, 2015




Figure 3: Proportions of single person household in Israel and in EU countries, 2011




Figure 4: Average age of women at first birth in Israel and in EU countries, 2019




Figure 5: Proportions of births outside of marriage in Israel and in EU countries, 2018




Figure 6: Proportions of childless women among women in ages 40-44 in Israel and in selected EU countries, 2011




Figure 7: Proportions of married persons among persons in ages 45-49, by sex, in Israel and in selected EU countries, 2014




Figure 8: Proportions of single persons among persons in ages 45-49, by sex, in Israel and in selected EU countries, 2014




Figure 9: Total Fertility Rates of women in Israel, 2010-2020




Figure 10: Proportions of single person households in Israel, 2010-2020




Figure 11: Proportions of births outside of marriage in Israel, 2010-2017





Figure 12: Proportions of divorced and single persons among persons in ages 45-49, by sex, in Israel, 2000-2014



Text 1: Independent variables

Independent variables are clustered into four groups: demographic variables,²⁶ Socio-Economic Status (SES) variables; geographical variables; faith variables.

The statistical analyses are implemented by methods of descriptive statistics as well as Linear Probability Models (LPMs). The methods are further elaborated in the Methods subsection. For now, it is worth mentioning that some independent variables are measured differently according to the statistical method.

Before providing further explanations, it is essential to mention that all independent variables are based on items that include the values “don’t know” and “irrelevant”.

Demographic variables

These variables include sex, marital status, age, number of children, place of birth, and another dichotomous variable about being born in the former USSR.

Sex – This is a categorical nominal variable. For both methods, it includes two values: men and women. The reference category in the LPMs refers to women.

Marital status²⁷ – This is a categorical nominal variable. For the descriptive statistics, this variable includes four values: married; divorced; widowed; single. The LPMs include three dichotomous variables of marital status in which the reference category refers to married people.

Age²⁸ - This is a numeric ordinal variable. For the descriptive statistics, age includes five age-groups: 20-29; 30-39; 40-49; 50-59; 60 and above. For the LPMs, however, age was treated as a parametric variable.

²⁶ Not including socioeconomic status variables.

²⁷ According to the questionnaires and codebooks, marital status included five values: married; living separately; divorced; widowed; single. In this current study, those who are living separately are considered married. In both rounds, this is because of the minute proportions of those who replied that they live separately.

²⁸ According to the codebooks, age is a calculated variable. In the questionnaires, there was a question about the year of birth, but there was no question about age. In the codebooks and data files, age includes eleven values of age-groups: 20-24; 25-29; 30-34; 35-39; 40-44; 45-49; 50-54; 55-59; 60-64; 65-74; 75 and above.

In order to examine the effects of age as a parametric variable, transformation was needed to be implemented. First, age was recalculated as the median age of for each respondent's age-group (age 22 for age-group 20-24; age 27 for age-group 25-29; age 32 for age-group 30-34; age 37 for age-group 35-39; age 42 for age-group 40-44; age 47 for age-group 45-49; age 52 for age-group 50-54; age 57 for age-group 55-59; age 62 for age-group 60-64; age 69.5 for age-group 65-74; age 79.5 for age-group 75 and above – by assuming that most respondents of this age-group are concentrated at ages 75-84). After recalculating the age variable, a mean of ages was calculated accordingly (46.39241 years) and subsequently was subtracted from the aforementioned new age variable. Consequently, a new variable was created - **the deviation from the mean age**. Last, this new variable was **squared**, and these two new variables appeared in the LPMs.

Number of children²⁹ - This is a numeric ordinal variable. In the descriptive statistics, number of children includes six values: no children; 1 child; 2 children; 3 children; 4 children; 5 children and above. The LPMs consists of eight values: no children; 1 child; 2 children; 3 children; 4 children; 5 children; 6 children; 7 children and above.

Place of birth³⁰ - This is a categorial nominal variable. It includes two values: born in Israel; not born in Israel. In the LPMs, those who were born in Israel are included in the reference category.

Born in the Former Soviet Union (FSU)³¹ - This is a categorial nominal variable. It is a calculated variable that refers to the Jewish population. This variable is included in the

²⁹ In the questionnaires, this was an open question that referred to the number of live births of the respondent. However, in the codebooks, answers of 7 children and above were grouped; therefore, in the data files, this variable is measured on an ordinal scale.

³⁰ In the questionnaires, there was a question about the country of birth, according to current borders. However, the codebooks and data files included a calculated variable of the continent of birth that has a distinct value for respondents who replied that their country of birth is Israel. The other values in this calculated variable are: Europe-America; Asia; Africa. Place of birth is calculated from the calculated variable of the continent of birth.

³¹ In the questionnaires, there was a question about the country of birth, according to current borders. However, the codebooks and data files included a calculated dichotomous variable with two values: born in the former USSR; not born in the former USSR. This calculated variable was analyzed only for the Jewish population, in this study.

descriptive statistics merely. Two values are included in this variable: Jews who were born in the FSU; Jews who were not born in the FSU. This variable was not analyzed in the LPMs.

SES variables

These variables include the level of education, employment status, and household expenditures coverage.

Level of education³² - This is an ordinal variable. It includes two values: academic education; non-academic education.³³ Non-academic education is the reference category in the LPMs.

Employment status³⁴ - This is a categorical nominal variable. It is based on a calculated variable that appears in the codebooks. In the descriptive statistics, this variable includes three values: employed; unemployed; does not belong to the labor force. In the LPMs, employment status is a dichotomous variable with two values: employed; unemployed or does not belong to the labor force. The latter is the reference category.

Household expenditures coverage³⁵ - This is a numeric ordinal variable. This variable includes four values: not managing at all; not managing that much; managing; managing

³² Level of education is based on a question in the questionnaires. This question goes by the following: “What is the highest diploma or degree that you have attained?” according to the questionnaire and the codebooks, this question includes seven values: high-school graduate diploma (which is not a matriculation certificate); matriculation certificate; graduate diploma from a tertiary school, which is not an academic diploma; first academic degree BA, or an equivalent degree; second academic degree MA, or an equivalent degree (including M.D. doctor in medicine); third academic degree Ph.D., or an equivalent degree; did not attain none of those mentioned above diplomas. Additionally, the codebook of round 2019 includes the value: did not study at all in an educational institution.

³³ Academic education includes the following answers regarding the highest diploma or degree: first academic degree BA, or an equivalent degree; second academic degree MA, or an equivalent degree (including M.D. doctor in medicine); third academic degree Ph.D., or an equivalent degree. Non-academic education includes the rest of the values of this question.

³⁴ According to the codebooks, this variable is calculated. For this variable, three values appear in the codebook of round 2009: employed (worked last week or was absent last week from his/her work); unemployed (looking for a job); does not belong to the workforce. The values that appear in the codebook of 2019 are similar, though shorter: employed; unemployed; does not belong to the workforce.

³⁵ Household expenditures coverage is based on a question in the questionnaires and the codebooks that go by the following: “Do you manage to cover all of the monthly expenditures for the food, electricity, phone,

without any difficulty. The same values appear in both the descriptive statistics as well as in the LPMs. In the LPMs, this variable is measured on a four-point ordinal scale, from not managing at all (value 0) to managing without any difficulty (value 3).

Household expenditures coverage is analyzed in this study only in reference to round 2019. Round 2009 had a relatively high proportion of unknown answers for this variable; hence, it was not included in the analyses.

Household expenditures coverage is analyzed in this study instead of the level of income. The reason level of income was not included in the analyses is also due to relatively high proportions of unknown answers.

Geographical variables

There are two geographical variables: type of residence and area of residence.

Type of residence³⁶ - This is a categorical nominal variable. This calculated variable includes two values: urban; suburban and rural. Respondents living in an urban environment are defined as those who reside in all cities with 200,000 residents and above, together with respondents who live in Tel-Aviv District in localities with less than 200,000 residents. Respondents living in a suburban and rural environment are defined as those who reside in all localities with less than 200,000 residents, not including those who live in Tel-Aviv District in such localities.

These two values (urban; suburban and rural) appear both in the descriptive statistics and in the LPMs. In the LPMs, the type of residence is analyzed as a dichotomous variable, and the reference category is suburban and rural.

etc.?". This variable includes four values: not managing at all; no managing that much; managing; managing without any difficulty.

³⁶ Type of residence is based on two calculated variables that appear in the codebooks (type of locality of residence and district of residence). Both of these calculated variables seem to be based on questions about the full address where the respondents live that appear on both questionnaires. The calculated variable of the type of locality of residence includes values with the name of cities that have 200,000 residents and above, as well as the following values: localities with 100,000 to 199,999 residents; localities with 50,000 to 99,999 residents; localities with 2,000 to 49,999 residents; Jewish rural localities; Arab rural localities. The calculated variable of the district of residence includes seven values: Jerusalem District; Northern District; Haifa District; Central District; Tel-Aviv District; Southern District; Judea and Samaria.

Area of residence³⁷ - This is a categorial nominal variable. This variable is based on a calculated variable that appears in the codebooks (type of locality of residence). Area of residence includes three values: Jerusalem; Tel-Aviv; other areas in Israel. The value of Jerusalem includes all respondents who live in the city of Jerusalem. The value of Tel-Aviv includes all the respondents who live in the city of Tel-Aviv. The value that refers to other areas in Israel includes the rest of the respondents.

In descriptive statistics, all three values of the area of residence appear. The LPMs include two dichotomous variables of area of residence in which the reference category refers to people who live in other areas in Israel.

Faith variables

There are two faith variables: religious affiliation and level of religiosity.

Religious affiliation³⁸ – This is a categorial nominal variable. For the descriptive statistics, this variable includes five values: Jewish; Muslim; Christian; Druze; Atheist. The LPMs include two dichotomous variables of religious affiliation (Jewish; Muslim) in which the reference category (other religious affiliations) refers to all the respondents who do not affiliate themselves as Jewish or Muslim (i.e., Christian, Druze, other religion or Atheist).

Level of religiosity - This is an ordinal variable based on self-definition. According to the questionnaires and codebooks, the current level of religiosity was asked on a five-point scale for the Jewish respondents and on a four-point scale for respondents who are Muslim, Christian, Druze, or respondents that follow other religions.

In descriptive statistics, the level of religiosity is analyzed twice - for Jews and for Muslims. The level of religiosity among Jews includes five values: not religious, secular; traditional, not that religious; traditional-religious; religious; orthodox. The level of religiosity

³⁷ Area of residence is based on a calculated variable that appears in the codebooks, which is called type of locality of residence. For more information on this variable, please see the previous footnote. The reason for using this calculated variable is that it includes the values of Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv.

³⁸ According to the questionnaires and codebooks, religious affiliation included six values: Jewish; Muslim; Christian; Druze; other religion; Athiest without religion. In this current study, the value of other religion is not included in the descriptive statistics. This is because the number of respondents who chose this value was minute in both rounds.

among Muslims includes four values: not religious; not religious that much; religious; very religious.

In the LPMs, a new unified variable of the level of religiosity was constructed to include all Israeli society sub-groups. This new variable consists of four values: secular; not religious that much; religious; orthodox, or very religious. Based on this new variable, three dichotomous variables were created (not religious that much; religious; orthodox or very religious). These dichotomous variables appear in the LPMs, while the reference category refers to the secular respondents.

It is worth mentioning how the new unified variable of the level of religiosity was constructed. Respondents who are considered **secular** are those who defined themselves as Atheists, or as Jews who are “not religious, secular” or as respondents who are following other religions (Muslims; Christians; Druze; followers of other religions) who are “not religious”. Respondents who are considered as **not religious that much** are those who defined themselves as Jews who are “traditional not that religious” or as following other religions (Muslims; Christians; Druze; followers of other religions) who are “not religious that much”. Respondents who are considered as **religious** are those who defined themselves as Jews who are “traditional-religious” or “religious”, or as following other religions (Muslims; Christians; Druze; followers of other religions) who are “religious”. Respondents who are considered as **orthodox or very-religious** are those who defined themselves as Jews who are “orthodox”, or as following other religions (Muslims; Christians; Druze; followers of other religions) who are “very religious”.

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